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Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el

From: Robert Pluim
Subject: Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el
Date: Tue, 31 May 2011 09:11:03 +0200
User-agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/24.0.50 (cygwin)

Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen <address@hidden> writes:

> Here's my concrete suggestion for how auth-source would deal with this
> stuff.
> The design requirements are:
> 1) if users want it, credentials should be encrypted
> 2) the credentials should be stored in a file that can be edited by
> hand, if necessary
> 5) it should be possible to check whether credentials exist without
> giving a password, even if the credentials are encrypted
> My solution to all this is to allow putting encrypted stuff into the
> ~/.authinfo file.
> It's currently a one-credential-per-line file like this, and this would
> still be perfectly valid:
> machine news.foo.org force yes port nntp login bar password zot
> However, if auth-info.el prompts somebody for a password, auth-info.el
> will also prompt them for whether the credentials should be stored
> encrypted.

Could this be a tri-state question: yes/no/never? (I'd be in the
never camp, but you'd need to store that response somewhere...)

Actually, there would be two questions: 
- do you want to store? y/n/never
- do you want to encrypt? y/n/never

with the 'never' modes being per-entry.


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