Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el

[Daiki Ueno]

Robert Pluim <address@hidden> writes:

> Stefan Monnier <address@hidden> writes:
>
>>> From my perspective the chief benefit is that any `auth-source-search'
>>> call against an unencrypted file will not require a passphrase until the
>>> password is actually needed, and yet the password will be stored
>>> securely.
>>
>> Sounds OK.  But only if you push if further and deprecate
>> authinfo.gpg.
>
> I'm not clear on why you'd want that.  I can imagine someone wanting to
> hide username & server identities from inspection, not just the
> associated passwords. ie I distinguish 3 cases
>
> 1) everything unencrypted
> 2) passwords encrypted only
> 3) everything encrypted

That reminds me of Lars' post on the Gnus list:

http://article.gmane.org/gmane.emacs.gnus.general/77172

in the discussion:

http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.emacs.gnus.general/77009/focus=77143

where I suggested to have a separate file to store unencrypted
information along with authinfo.gpg.  I can't remember what was the
conclusion :)

Regards,
-- 
Daiki Ueno