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Re: GRUB trusted boot framework

From: phcoder
Subject: Re: GRUB trusted boot framework
Date: Sun, 22 Feb 2009 14:56:18 +0100
User-agent: Thunderbird (X11/20090105)

- hooks for any disk read (not sure if write is necessary)
This way how trusted grub does it is an ad-hoc solution which results in a MESS. They just try to hash and rehash everything without design. So if grub is instructed to load all modules in a directory and filesystem is reindexed then grub will load the same modules in a different order which results in a different hash. IMO we can't allow such thing to come to grub2 it's just against its basic design principles. Much better would be a layer similar to gzio:

grub_gnupg_open (const char *filename, int flags, struct grub_gnupg_info *info); Which internally checks the certificate. This layer can also encrypt/decrypt from gnupg containers Then all kernel and config loads would use this function instead of grub_gzio_open and grub_gnupg_open would check if its contents is gzipped. Flags can include:
if signature can be checked later on (e.g. signed ELF)
Then the behavior is controlled by an environment variable
If grub_gnupg_open is invoked without GRUB_GNUPG_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSIGNED and allow_unsigned=no and signature is broken or not present it should prompt for password (if it isn't supplied yet) and write something like
File %s is unsigned. Are you sure you want to load it? Type "YES" if you do.
Vladimir 'phcoder' Serbinenko

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