01/01: gnu: dropbear: Fix CVE-2018-15599.

[Leo Famulari]

lfam pushed a commit to branch master
in repository guix.

commit 8a5a1eff422c5e3bca785f3967d444d0eafcf9c3
Author: Leo Famulari <address@hidden>
Date:   Mon Aug 27 15:13:01 2018 -0400

    gnu: dropbear: Fix CVE-2018-15599.
    
    * gnu/packages/patches/dropbear-CVE-2018-15599.patch: New file.
    * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add it.
    * gnu/packages/ssh.scm (dropbear)[source]: Use it.
---
 gnu/local.mk                                       |   1 +
 gnu/packages/patches/dropbear-CVE-2018-15599.patch | 240 +++++++++++++++++++++
 gnu/packages/ssh.scm                               |   1 +
 3 files changed, 242 insertions(+)

diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk
index a2e5385..7b980b2 100644
--- a/gnu/local.mk
+++ b/gnu/local.mk
@@ -651,6 +651,7 @@ dist_patch_DATA =                                           
\
   %D%/packages/patches/dovecot-trees-support-dovecot-2.3.patch \
   %D%/packages/patches/doxygen-gcc-ice.patch                   \
   %D%/packages/patches/doxygen-test.patch                      \
+  %D%/packages/patches/dropbear-CVE-2018-15599.patch           \
   %D%/packages/patches/dvd+rw-tools-add-include.patch          \
   %D%/packages/patches/elfutils-tests-ptrace.patch             \
   %D%/packages/patches/elogind-glibc-2.27.patch                        \
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/dropbear-CVE-2018-15599.patch 
b/gnu/packages/patches/dropbear-CVE-2018-15599.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a474552
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/dropbear-CVE-2018-15599.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+Fix CVE-2018-15599:
+
+http://lists.ucc.gu.uwa.edu.au/pipermail/dropbear/2018q3/002108.html
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-15599
+
+Patch copied from upstream source repository:
+
+https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/commit/52adbb34c32d3e2e1bcdb941e20a6f81138b8248
+
+From 52adbb34c32d3e2e1bcdb941e20a6f81138b8248 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Johnston <address@hidden>
+Date: Thu, 23 Aug 2018 23:43:12 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Wait to fail invalid usernames
+
+---
+ auth.h           |  6 +++---
+ svr-auth.c       | 19 +++++--------------
+ svr-authpam.c    | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
+ svr-authpasswd.c | 27 ++++++++++++++-------------
+ svr-authpubkey.c | 11 ++++++++++-
+ 5 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+index da498f5b..98f54683 100644
+--- a/auth.h
++++ b/auth.h
+@@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_request(void);
+ void send_msg_userauth_failure(int partial, int incrfail);
+ void send_msg_userauth_success(void);
+ void send_msg_userauth_banner(const buffer *msg);
+-void svr_auth_password(void);
+-void svr_auth_pubkey(void);
+-void svr_auth_pam(void);
++void svr_auth_password(int valid_user);
++void svr_auth_pubkey(int valid_user);
++void svr_auth_pam(int valid_user);
+ 
+ #if DROPBEAR_SVR_PUBKEY_OPTIONS_BUILT
+ int svr_pubkey_allows_agentfwd(void);
+diff --git a/svr-auth.c b/svr-auth.c
+index c19c0901..edde86bc 100644
+--- a/svr-auth.c
++++ b/svr-auth.c
+@@ -149,10 +149,8 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_request() {
+               if (methodlen == AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN &&
+                               strncmp(methodname, AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD,
+                                       AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN) == 0) {
+-                      if (valid_user) {
+-                              svr_auth_password();
+-                              goto out;
+-                      }
++                      svr_auth_password(valid_user);
++                      goto out;
+               }
+       }
+ #endif
+@@ -164,10 +162,8 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_request() {
+               if (methodlen == AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN &&
+                               strncmp(methodname, AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD,
+                                       AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN) == 0) {
+-                      if (valid_user) {
+-                              svr_auth_pam();
+-                              goto out;
+-                      }
++                      svr_auth_pam(valid_user);
++                      goto out;
+               }
+       }
+ #endif
+@@ -177,12 +173,7 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_request() {
+       if (methodlen == AUTH_METHOD_PUBKEY_LEN &&
+                       strncmp(methodname, AUTH_METHOD_PUBKEY,
+                               AUTH_METHOD_PUBKEY_LEN) == 0) {
+-              if (valid_user) {
+-                      svr_auth_pubkey();
+-              } else {
+-                      /* pubkey has no failure delay */
+-                      send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 0);
+-              }
++              svr_auth_pubkey(valid_user);
+               goto out;
+       }
+ #endif
+diff --git a/svr-authpam.c b/svr-authpam.c
+index 05e4f3e5..d201bc96 100644
+--- a/svr-authpam.c
++++ b/svr-authpam.c
+@@ -178,13 +178,14 @@ pamConvFunc(int num_msg,
+  * Keyboard interactive would be a lot nicer, but since PAM is synchronous, it
+  * gets very messy trying to send the interactive challenges, and read the
+  * interactive responses, over the network. */
+-void svr_auth_pam() {
++void svr_auth_pam(int valid_user) {
+ 
+       struct UserDataS userData = {NULL, NULL};
+       struct pam_conv pamConv = {
+               pamConvFunc,
+               &userData /* submitted to pamvConvFunc as appdata_ptr */ 
+       };
++      const char* printable_user = NULL;
+ 
+       pam_handle_t* pamHandlep = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -204,12 +205,23 @@ void svr_auth_pam() {
+ 
+       password = buf_getstring(ses.payload, &passwordlen);
+ 
++      /* We run the PAM conversation regardless of whether the username is 
valid
++      in case the conversation function has an inherent delay.
++      Use ses.authstate.username rather than ses.authstate.pw_name.
++      After PAM succeeds we then check the valid_user flag too */
++
+       /* used to pass data to the PAM conversation function - don't bother 
with
+        * strdup() etc since these are touched only by our own conversation
+        * function (above) which takes care of it */
+-      userData.user = ses.authstate.pw_name;
++      userData.user = ses.authstate.username;
+       userData.passwd = password;
+ 
++      if (ses.authstate.pw_name) {
++              printable_user = ses.authstate.pw_name;
++      } else {
++              printable_user = "<invalid username>";
++      }
++
+       /* Init pam */
+       if ((rc = pam_start("sshd", NULL, &pamConv, &pamHandlep)) != 
PAM_SUCCESS) {
+               dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "pam_start() failed, rc=%d, %s", 
+@@ -242,7 +254,7 @@ void svr_auth_pam() {
+                               rc, pam_strerror(pamHandlep, rc));
+               dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING,
+                               "Bad PAM password attempt for '%s' from %s",
+-                              ses.authstate.pw_name,
++                              printable_user,
+                               svr_ses.addrstring);
+               send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1);
+               goto cleanup;
+@@ -253,12 +265,18 @@ void svr_auth_pam() {
+                               rc, pam_strerror(pamHandlep, rc));
+               dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING,
+                               "Bad PAM password attempt for '%s' from %s",
+-                              ses.authstate.pw_name,
++                              printable_user,
+                               svr_ses.addrstring);
+               send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1);
+               goto cleanup;
+       }
+ 
++      if (!valid_user) {
++              /* PAM auth succeeded but the username isn't allowed in for 
another reason
++              (checkusername() failed) */
++              send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1);
++      }
++
+       /* successful authentication */
+       dropbear_log(LOG_NOTICE, "PAM password auth succeeded for '%s' from %s",
+                       ses.authstate.pw_name,
+diff --git a/svr-authpasswd.c b/svr-authpasswd.c
+index bdee2aa1..69c7d8af 100644
+--- a/svr-authpasswd.c
++++ b/svr-authpasswd.c
+@@ -48,22 +48,14 @@ static int constant_time_strcmp(const char* a, const char* 
b) {
+ 
+ /* Process a password auth request, sending success or failure messages as
+  * appropriate */
+-void svr_auth_password() {
++void svr_auth_password(int valid_user) {
+       
+       char * passwdcrypt = NULL; /* the crypt from /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow 
*/
+       char * testcrypt = NULL; /* crypt generated from the user's password 
sent */
+-      char * password;
++      char * password = NULL;
+       unsigned int passwordlen;
+-
+       unsigned int changepw;
+ 
+-      passwdcrypt = ses.authstate.pw_passwd;
+-
+-#ifdef DEBUG_HACKCRYPT
+-      /* debugging crypt for non-root testing with shadows */
+-      passwdcrypt = DEBUG_HACKCRYPT;
+-#endif
+-
+       /* check if client wants to change password */
+       changepw = buf_getbool(ses.payload);
+       if (changepw) {
+@@ -73,12 +65,21 @@ void svr_auth_password() {
+       }
+ 
+       password = buf_getstring(ses.payload, &passwordlen);
+-
+-      /* the first bytes of passwdcrypt are the salt */
+-      testcrypt = crypt(password, passwdcrypt);
++      if (valid_user) {
++              /* the first bytes of passwdcrypt are the salt */
++              passwdcrypt = ses.authstate.pw_passwd;
++              testcrypt = crypt(password, passwdcrypt);
++      }
+       m_burn(password, passwordlen);
+       m_free(password);
+ 
++      /* After we have got the payload contents we can exit if the username
++      is invalid. Invalid users have already been logged. */
++      if (!valid_user) {
++              send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1);
++              return;
++      }
++
+       if (testcrypt == NULL) {
+               /* crypt() with an invalid salt like "!!" */
+               dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "User account '%s' is locked",
+diff --git a/svr-authpubkey.c b/svr-authpubkey.c
+index aa6087c9..ff481c87 100644
+--- a/svr-authpubkey.c
++++ b/svr-authpubkey.c
+@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static int checkfileperm(char * filename);
+ 
+ /* process a pubkey auth request, sending success or failure message as
+  * appropriate */
+-void svr_auth_pubkey() {
++void svr_auth_pubkey(int valid_user) {
+ 
+       unsigned char testkey; /* whether we're just checking if a key is 
usable */
+       char* algo = NULL; /* pubkey algo */
+@@ -102,6 +102,15 @@ void svr_auth_pubkey() {
+       keybloblen = buf_getint(ses.payload);
+       keyblob = buf_getptr(ses.payload, keybloblen);
+ 
++      if (!valid_user) {
++              /* Return failure once we have read the contents of the packet
++              required to validate a public key. 
++              Avoids blind user enumeration though it isn't possible to 
prevent
++              testing for user existence if the public key is known */
++              send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 0);
++              goto out;
++      }
++
+       /* check if the key is valid */
+       if (checkpubkey(algo, algolen, keyblob, keybloblen) == 
DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
+               send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 0);
diff --git a/gnu/packages/ssh.scm b/gnu/packages/ssh.scm
index a58ebff..03c4e3c 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/ssh.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/ssh.scm
@@ -440,6 +440,7 @@ TCP, not the SSH protocol.")
               (uri (string-append
                     "https://matt.ucc.asn.au/"; name "/releases/"
                     name "-" version ".tar.bz2"))
+              (patches (search-patches "dropbear-CVE-2018-15599.patch"))
               (sha256
                (base32
                 "0rgavbzw7jrs5wslxm0dnwx2m409yzxd9hazd92r7kx8xikr3yzj"))))