[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
59/59: gnu: dropbear: Update to 2019.77.
|
From: |
guix-commits |
|
Subject: |
59/59: gnu: dropbear: Update to 2019.77. |
|
Date: |
Sat, 23 Mar 2019 11:04:21 -0400 (EDT) |
nckx pushed a commit to branch master
in repository guix.
commit e190d12eae25fff8ab818a94c8fd5302bdc797dd
Author: Tobias Geerinckx-Rice <address@hidden>
Date: Sat Mar 23 16:02:35 2019 +0100
gnu: dropbear: Update to 2019.77.
* gnu/packages/ssh.scm (dropbear): Update to 2019.77.
[source]: Remove patch.
* gnu/packages/patches/dropbear-CVE-2018-15599.patch: Delete file.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Remove it.
---
gnu/local.mk | 1 -
gnu/packages/patches/dropbear-CVE-2018-15599.patch | 240 ---------------------
gnu/packages/ssh.scm | 21 +-
3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 252 deletions(-)
diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk
index d85679b..594755f 100644
--- a/gnu/local.mk
+++ b/gnu/local.mk
@@ -728,7 +728,6 @@ dist_patch_DATA =
\
%D%/packages/patches/docker-fix-tests.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/dovecot-trees-support-dovecot-2.3.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/doxygen-test.patch \
- %D%/packages/patches/dropbear-CVE-2018-15599.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/dvd+rw-tools-add-include.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/efl-mesa-compat.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/elfutils-tests-ptrace.patch \
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/dropbear-CVE-2018-15599.patch
b/gnu/packages/patches/dropbear-CVE-2018-15599.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a474552..0000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/dropbear-CVE-2018-15599.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,240 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2018-15599:
-
-http://lists.ucc.gu.uwa.edu.au/pipermail/dropbear/2018q3/002108.html
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-15599
-
-Patch copied from upstream source repository:
-
-https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/commit/52adbb34c32d3e2e1bcdb941e20a6f81138b8248
-
-From 52adbb34c32d3e2e1bcdb941e20a6f81138b8248 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Johnston <address@hidden>
-Date: Thu, 23 Aug 2018 23:43:12 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] Wait to fail invalid usernames
-
----
- auth.h | 6 +++---
- svr-auth.c | 19 +++++--------------
- svr-authpam.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
- svr-authpasswd.c | 27 ++++++++++++++-------------
- svr-authpubkey.c | 11 ++++++++++-
- 5 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
-index da498f5b..98f54683 100644
---- a/auth.h
-+++ b/auth.h
-@@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_request(void);
- void send_msg_userauth_failure(int partial, int incrfail);
- void send_msg_userauth_success(void);
- void send_msg_userauth_banner(const buffer *msg);
--void svr_auth_password(void);
--void svr_auth_pubkey(void);
--void svr_auth_pam(void);
-+void svr_auth_password(int valid_user);
-+void svr_auth_pubkey(int valid_user);
-+void svr_auth_pam(int valid_user);
-
- #if DROPBEAR_SVR_PUBKEY_OPTIONS_BUILT
- int svr_pubkey_allows_agentfwd(void);
-diff --git a/svr-auth.c b/svr-auth.c
-index c19c0901..edde86bc 100644
---- a/svr-auth.c
-+++ b/svr-auth.c
-@@ -149,10 +149,8 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_request() {
- if (methodlen == AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN &&
- strncmp(methodname, AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD,
- AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN) == 0) {
-- if (valid_user) {
-- svr_auth_password();
-- goto out;
-- }
-+ svr_auth_password(valid_user);
-+ goto out;
- }
- }
- #endif
-@@ -164,10 +162,8 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_request() {
- if (methodlen == AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN &&
- strncmp(methodname, AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD,
- AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN) == 0) {
-- if (valid_user) {
-- svr_auth_pam();
-- goto out;
-- }
-+ svr_auth_pam(valid_user);
-+ goto out;
- }
- }
- #endif
-@@ -177,12 +173,7 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_request() {
- if (methodlen == AUTH_METHOD_PUBKEY_LEN &&
- strncmp(methodname, AUTH_METHOD_PUBKEY,
- AUTH_METHOD_PUBKEY_LEN) == 0) {
-- if (valid_user) {
-- svr_auth_pubkey();
-- } else {
-- /* pubkey has no failure delay */
-- send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 0);
-- }
-+ svr_auth_pubkey(valid_user);
- goto out;
- }
- #endif
-diff --git a/svr-authpam.c b/svr-authpam.c
-index 05e4f3e5..d201bc96 100644
---- a/svr-authpam.c
-+++ b/svr-authpam.c
-@@ -178,13 +178,14 @@ pamConvFunc(int num_msg,
- * Keyboard interactive would be a lot nicer, but since PAM is synchronous, it
- * gets very messy trying to send the interactive challenges, and read the
- * interactive responses, over the network. */
--void svr_auth_pam() {
-+void svr_auth_pam(int valid_user) {
-
- struct UserDataS userData = {NULL, NULL};
- struct pam_conv pamConv = {
- pamConvFunc,
- &userData /* submitted to pamvConvFunc as appdata_ptr */
- };
-+ const char* printable_user = NULL;
-
- pam_handle_t* pamHandlep = NULL;
-
-@@ -204,12 +205,23 @@ void svr_auth_pam() {
-
- password = buf_getstring(ses.payload, &passwordlen);
-
-+ /* We run the PAM conversation regardless of whether the username is
valid
-+ in case the conversation function has an inherent delay.
-+ Use ses.authstate.username rather than ses.authstate.pw_name.
-+ After PAM succeeds we then check the valid_user flag too */
-+
- /* used to pass data to the PAM conversation function - don't bother
with
- * strdup() etc since these are touched only by our own conversation
- * function (above) which takes care of it */
-- userData.user = ses.authstate.pw_name;
-+ userData.user = ses.authstate.username;
- userData.passwd = password;
-
-+ if (ses.authstate.pw_name) {
-+ printable_user = ses.authstate.pw_name;
-+ } else {
-+ printable_user = "<invalid username>";
-+ }
-+
- /* Init pam */
- if ((rc = pam_start("sshd", NULL, &pamConv, &pamHandlep)) !=
PAM_SUCCESS) {
- dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "pam_start() failed, rc=%d, %s",
-@@ -242,7 +254,7 @@ void svr_auth_pam() {
- rc, pam_strerror(pamHandlep, rc));
- dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING,
- "Bad PAM password attempt for '%s' from %s",
-- ses.authstate.pw_name,
-+ printable_user,
- svr_ses.addrstring);
- send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1);
- goto cleanup;
-@@ -253,12 +265,18 @@ void svr_auth_pam() {
- rc, pam_strerror(pamHandlep, rc));
- dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING,
- "Bad PAM password attempt for '%s' from %s",
-- ses.authstate.pw_name,
-+ printable_user,
- svr_ses.addrstring);
- send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1);
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
-+ if (!valid_user) {
-+ /* PAM auth succeeded but the username isn't allowed in for
another reason
-+ (checkusername() failed) */
-+ send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1);
-+ }
-+
- /* successful authentication */
- dropbear_log(LOG_NOTICE, "PAM password auth succeeded for '%s' from %s",
- ses.authstate.pw_name,
-diff --git a/svr-authpasswd.c b/svr-authpasswd.c
-index bdee2aa1..69c7d8af 100644
---- a/svr-authpasswd.c
-+++ b/svr-authpasswd.c
-@@ -48,22 +48,14 @@ static int constant_time_strcmp(const char* a, const char*
b) {
-
- /* Process a password auth request, sending success or failure messages as
- * appropriate */
--void svr_auth_password() {
-+void svr_auth_password(int valid_user) {
-
- char * passwdcrypt = NULL; /* the crypt from /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow
*/
- char * testcrypt = NULL; /* crypt generated from the user's password
sent */
-- char * password;
-+ char * password = NULL;
- unsigned int passwordlen;
--
- unsigned int changepw;
-
-- passwdcrypt = ses.authstate.pw_passwd;
--
--#ifdef DEBUG_HACKCRYPT
-- /* debugging crypt for non-root testing with shadows */
-- passwdcrypt = DEBUG_HACKCRYPT;
--#endif
--
- /* check if client wants to change password */
- changepw = buf_getbool(ses.payload);
- if (changepw) {
-@@ -73,12 +65,21 @@ void svr_auth_password() {
- }
-
- password = buf_getstring(ses.payload, &passwordlen);
--
-- /* the first bytes of passwdcrypt are the salt */
-- testcrypt = crypt(password, passwdcrypt);
-+ if (valid_user) {
-+ /* the first bytes of passwdcrypt are the salt */
-+ passwdcrypt = ses.authstate.pw_passwd;
-+ testcrypt = crypt(password, passwdcrypt);
-+ }
- m_burn(password, passwordlen);
- m_free(password);
-
-+ /* After we have got the payload contents we can exit if the username
-+ is invalid. Invalid users have already been logged. */
-+ if (!valid_user) {
-+ send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
- if (testcrypt == NULL) {
- /* crypt() with an invalid salt like "!!" */
- dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "User account '%s' is locked",
-diff --git a/svr-authpubkey.c b/svr-authpubkey.c
-index aa6087c9..ff481c87 100644
---- a/svr-authpubkey.c
-+++ b/svr-authpubkey.c
-@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static int checkfileperm(char * filename);
-
- /* process a pubkey auth request, sending success or failure message as
- * appropriate */
--void svr_auth_pubkey() {
-+void svr_auth_pubkey(int valid_user) {
-
- unsigned char testkey; /* whether we're just checking if a key is
usable */
- char* algo = NULL; /* pubkey algo */
-@@ -102,6 +102,15 @@ void svr_auth_pubkey() {
- keybloblen = buf_getint(ses.payload);
- keyblob = buf_getptr(ses.payload, keybloblen);
-
-+ if (!valid_user) {
-+ /* Return failure once we have read the contents of the packet
-+ required to validate a public key.
-+ Avoids blind user enumeration though it isn't possible to
prevent
-+ testing for user existence if the public key is known */
-+ send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 0);
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+
- /* check if the key is valid */
- if (checkpubkey(algo, algolen, keyblob, keybloblen) ==
DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
- send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 0);
diff --git a/gnu/packages/ssh.scm b/gnu/packages/ssh.scm
index f5e069f..bd26149 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/ssh.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/ssh.scm
@@ -451,18 +451,17 @@ TCP, not the SSH protocol.")
(define-public dropbear
(package
(name "dropbear")
- (version "2018.76")
- (source (origin
- (method url-fetch)
- (uri (string-append
- "https://matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/releases/";
- "dropbear-" version ".tar.bz2"))
- (patches (search-patches "dropbear-CVE-2018-15599.patch"))
- (sha256
- (base32
- "0rgavbzw7jrs5wslxm0dnwx2m409yzxd9hazd92r7kx8xikr3yzj"))))
+ (version "2019.77")
+ (source
+ (origin
+ (method url-fetch)
+ (uri (string-append
+ "https://matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/releases/";
+ "dropbear-" version ".tar.bz2"))
+ (sha256
+ (base32 "13a55fcy2mx2pvsfj6dh9107k4wnbd9ybdyi3w3ivgikwvmph7yr"))))
(build-system gnu-build-system)
- (arguments `(#:tests? #f)) ; there is no "make check" or anything similar
+ (arguments `(#:tests? #f)) ; there is no "make check" or anything similar
;; TODO: Investigate unbundling libtommath and libtomcrypt or at least
;; cherry-picking important bug fixes from them. See <bugs.gnu.org/24674>
;; for more information.
- 16/59: gnu: perl-tree-simple-visitorfactory: Update to 0.15., (continued)
- 16/59: gnu: perl-tree-simple-visitorfactory: Update to 0.15., guix-commits, 2019/03/23
- 28/59: gnu: perl-term-size-perl: Update to 0.031., guix-commits, 2019/03/23
- 36/59: gnu: perl-parent: Update to 0.237., guix-commits, 2019/03/23
- 38/59: gnu: perl-moosex-params-validate: Update to 0.21., guix-commits, 2019/03/23
- 41/59: gnu: perl-exporter-tiny: Update to 1.002001., guix-commits, 2019/03/23
- 45/59: gnu: perl-pathtools: Update to 3.75., guix-commits, 2019/03/23
- 46/59: gnu: perl-type-tiny: Update to 1.004004., guix-commits, 2019/03/23
- 54/59: gnu: perl-list-someutils: Update to 0.56., guix-commits, 2019/03/23
- 55/59: gnu: perl-path-tiny: Update to 0.108., guix-commits, 2019/03/23
- 57/59: gnu: perl-text-simpletable: Update to 2.07., guix-commits, 2019/03/23
- 59/59: gnu: dropbear: Update to 2019.77.,
guix-commits <=
- 58/59: gnu: dropbear: Don't use NAME in source URI., guix-commits, 2019/03/23