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[Gzz-commits] gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu researc...


From: Hermanni Hyytiälä
Subject: [Gzz-commits] gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu researc...
Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2003 09:38:12 -0500

CVSROOT:        /cvsroot/gzz
Module name:    gzz
Changes by:     Hermanni Hyytiälä <address@hidden>      03/02/10 09:38:11

Modified files:
        Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu: research_problems 

Log message:
        More security problems

CVSWeb URLs:
http://savannah.gnu.org/cgi-bin/viewcvs/gzz/gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu/research_problems.diff?tr1=1.51&tr2=1.52&r1=text&r2=text

Patches:
Index: gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu/research_problems
diff -u gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu/research_problems:1.51 
gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu/research_problems:1.52
--- gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu/research_problems:1.51      Mon Feb 
10 09:17:46 2003
+++ gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu/research_problems   Mon Feb 10 
09:38:11 2003
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@
                                        exists (broadcasting)                   
        caching techiques
                                        
 Entity identification:                 Identify participating entities 
reliably        Digital signatures                              Research 
focused on persistence,
-                                       and efficiently                         
                                                        not on distiinction of 
identity
+                                       and efficiently                         
                                                        not on distinction of 
identity
 
 Fail Stop:                             A faulty node stops working             
        Environment observatorion, informing
                                                                                
        protocols
@@ -266,16 +266,16 @@
                                        
 Data integrity/authenticity:           Integrity/originality of data is 
unknown        Cryptographic content hashes
 
-Anonymity:                             Anonymity cannot be provided in all     
        Remailers
+Anonymity:                             Anonymity cannot be provided in all     
        Remailers, pre-routing
                                        cases
                        
 Malicious nodes:                       There are malicious nodes in the 
system,        Create invariants for node behaviour,
                                        how we are able to discover them ?      
        verify invariants
                                        
-Mutual distrust:                       Nobody trust anybody, this is a problem 
        Reputation methods
-
-Lack of motivation to cooperate:       All participants do not behave          
        
-                                       like they should be, instead they go 
for 
+Mutual distrust:                       Nobody trust anybody, this is a problem 
        Different reputation methods                    Resource demanding, not 
practical to
+                                                                               
                                                        implement       
+Lack of motivation to cooperate:       All participants do not behave          
        Different reputation methods                    Resource demanding, not 
practical to
+                                       like they should be, instead they go 
for                                                        implement
                                        own profit
                                        
 Heterogeneity:                         There are different kind of nodes       
        Super peers, cluster (broadcasting),
@@ -305,8 +305,8 @@
 Access Control:                                Can we define access control 
levels             -                                               -
                                        in peer-to-peer network ?
                                        
-System in flux:                                Nodes join and leave system 
constantly:         Half-life phenomenon (analysis)
-                                       load balancing, efficiency ?
+System in flux:                                Nodes join and leave system 
constantly:         Half-life phenomenon (for analysis),
+                                       load balancing, efficiency ?            
        simple overlay and construction protocol
                                        
 Inconsistent behaviour:                        Hostile node could act 
correctly with           Public keys, digital signatures                 Not 
practical approach
                                        its neighbors, but incorrectly with 
other
@@ -314,17 +314,11 @@
 Hostile groups:                                Joining node may join parallel 
network,         Use trusted nodes, based on
                                        formed a group of hostile nodes         
        history information
                                        
-External threats:                      Viruses, troijans, sniffers             
        
+External threats:                      Viruses, troijans, sniffers             
        -                                               -
                                                                                
        
-Illegal overlay construction:          Hostile node(s) controls the 
construction       Cryptography    
+Illegal overlay construction:          Hostile node(s) controls the 
construction       Cryptography                                    
                                        of the network
 
-at each hop, querier knows that the lookup is supposed to get "closer". The 
querier should check this so that
-                                  this attack can be detected and backtrack as 
necessary in routing path
-               -incorrect routing updates
-                       -problem: an individual malicious node could corrupt 
the routing tables of other nodes by sending incorrect updates
-                       -solution: system maintains information of requirements 
of correct routing tables (and verifies them)            
-                                       
 
 
 * = In Kademlia, there is no action required when nodes leaves the system




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