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[Gzz-commits] gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu researc...
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From: |
Hermanni Hyytiälä |
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Subject: |
[Gzz-commits] gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu researc... |
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Date: |
Tue, 11 Feb 2003 03:52:23 -0500 |
CVSROOT: /cvsroot/gzz
Module name: gzz
Changes by: Hermanni Hyytiälä <address@hidden> 03/02/11 03:52:23
Modified files:
Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu: research_problems
Log message:
Finished first version of problems table
CVSWeb URLs:
http://savannah.gnu.org/cgi-bin/viewcvs/gzz/gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu/research_problems.diff?tr1=1.53&tr2=1.54&r1=text&r2=text
Patches:
Index: gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu/research_problems
diff -u gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu/research_problems:1.53
gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu/research_problems:1.54
--- gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu/research_problems:1.53 Mon Feb
10 09:44:07 2003
+++ gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu/research_problems Tue Feb 11
03:52:23 2003
@@ -170,6 +170,8 @@
3) Overview of basic gnutella network
4) Overview of gnutella network with some improvements (super nodes and
clusters)
5) Figure presenting k-ary tree (--> log n efficiency)
+6) Picture of xu-structure
+7) Picture of urn-5 (pointer) and immutable data
Include following tables:
@@ -213,111 +215,125 @@
3) p2p open problems table:
Problem description
Solutions Comments/Status
-Routing: Incorrect forwarding (hostile),
Query monitoring, cross check Proposed solutions are
working,
- incorrect routing (hostile)
routing tables, verify routing tables, but increases system
complexity
-
invariants
+Routing: Incorrect forwarding (hostile),
Query monitoring, cross check Increases system
complexity
+ incorrect routing (hostile)
routing tables, verify routing tables,
+
create routing table invariants
-DoS attack Distributed, controlled burden againts
Client puzzles, load balancing, traffic
- specific computer(s)
measurements, traffic models
+DoS attack: Distributed, controlled burden againts
Client puzzles, load balancing, traffic Only partial solutions,
traffic
+ specific computer(s)
measurements, traffic models, replication models most effective
Sybil attack: Single hostile entity present multiple
Identify all nodes simultaneously Not practically
realizable,
entities
across the system, collect pool of nodes research focused on
persistence,
which are validated, distributed not on distinction
node ID creation
-Spam attack: Hostile entity creates false versions
Do not trust to single entity,
- of data
get information from multiple entities,
+Spam attack: Hostile entity creates false versions
Do not trust to single entity, Efficient, easy to
implement,
+ of data
get information from multiple entities, creates more network
traffic
trust on majority's opinion
-Resource spoofing: Hostile entity gives wrong information
Do not trust to single entity,
- about the data which entity is
responsible get information from multiple entities,
+Resource spoofing: Hostile entity gives wrong information
Do not trust to single entity, Efficient, easy to
implement,
+ about the data which entity is
responsible get information from multiple entities, creates more
network traffic
for/knows about
trust on majority's opinion
-Sudden network partition: Sub network is isolated from other
network Self-tuning, environment observatorion,
- because of network disconnection
backup connections
+Sudden network partition: Sub network is isolated from other
network Self-tuning, environment observatorion, Creates more
overhead/space
+ because of network disconnection
backup connections requirements per node
-Searching: Efficient searching requires exploiting
View trees, bloom filters
+Searching: Efficient searching requires exploiting
View trees, bloom filters Effective, but not
flexible
of previous queries
-Efficient data discovery: Find resources efficiently, if resource
Super nodes, node clusters,
- exists (broadcasting)
caching techiques
+Efficient data discovery: Find resources efficiently, if resource
Super nodes, node clusters, Morre effiecient, less
network traffic,
+ exists (broadcasting)
caching techiques not comparable to DHT's
efficiency
-Entity identification: Identify participating entities
reliably Digital signatures Research
focused on persistence,
+Entity identification: Identify participating entities
reliably Digital signatures, key infrastrucure Research
focused on persistence,
and efficiently
not on distinction of
identity
-Fail Stop: A faulty node stops working
Environment observatorion, informing
-
protocols
+Fail Stop: A faulty node stops working
Environment observatorion, informing Creates more network
traffics,
+
protocols node's information can
be outdated
-Byzantine faults: Faulty nodes may behave arbitrarily
Byzantine agreement protocols,
-
trust on majority's opinion
-
-Richness of queries: Query languages should be more powerful
SQL-like queries
-
-Robustness: How well system performs under hostile
Self-tuning, backup links, use
+Byzantine faults: Faulty nodes may behave arbitrarily
Byzantine replication protocols Much research has been
done on this field,
+
practical solutions,
decreases system's
+
performance slighly
+
+Richness of queries: Query languages should be more powerful
SQL-like queries Hard to implement,
increases system complexity,
+
not much research has
been done
+
+Robustness: How well system performs under hostile
Self-tuning, backup links, use Working solutions
attacks/in the case of severe failure ?
diverse routing paths
-Quality of Service, QoS: The system cannot promise the quality
of If needed, use Network proximity
- service in all cases
for better network performance
+Quality of Service, QoS: The system cannot promise the quality
of Use Network proximity Increases system
complexity, no real world
+ service in all cases
for better network performance experiences
(bandwidth, latency, jitter, packet
loss)
-Data availability: Data might be temporary unavailable, or
lost Data caching, data replication
- permanently
+Data availability: Data might be temporary unavailable, or
lost Data caching, data replication Working solutions, but
creates more traffic
+ permanently
and overhead per node
-Data integrity/authenticity: Integrity/originality of data is
unknown Cryptographic content hashes
-
-Anonymity: Anonymity cannot be provided in all
Remailers, pre-routing
+Data integrity/authenticity: Integrity/originality of data is
unknown Cryptographic content hashes, key For data
integrity, there are working solutions,
+
architectures for data authenticity,
there are not working solutions/
+
there are partial
solutions, which are not practically
+
realizable
+
+Anonymity: Anonymity cannot be provided in all
Remailers, pre-routing Total anonymity cannot
be provided yet
cases
-Malicious nodes: There are malicious nodes in the
system, Create invariants for node behaviour,
- how we are able to discover them ?
verify invariants
+Malicious nodes: There are malicious nodes in the
system, Create invariants for node behaviour, Partial
solutions, self-certifying data most realiable
+ how we are able to discover them ?
verify invariants, self-certifying data
-Mutual distrust: Nobody trust anybody, this is a problem
Different reputation methods Resource demanding, not
practical to
-
implement
-Lack of motivation to cooperate: All participants do not behave
Different reputation methods Resource demanding, not
practical to
- like they should be, instead they go
for implement
+Mutual distrust: Nobody trust anybody, this is a problem
Different reputation methods, key Resource demanding, not
practical to
+
infrastructures implement/not working
solutions, no real world
+
experience in a wide
scale
+
+Lack of motivation to cooperate: All participants do not behave
Different reputation methods No real world
experience in a wide scale
+ like they should be, instead they go
for
own profit
-Heterogeneity: There are different kind of nodes
Super peers, cluster (broadcasting),
- in the system, in light of bandwidth
additional layer upn DHT, structural
- and computing power
simplicity (DHTs)
+Heterogeneity: There are different kind of nodes
Super peers (broadcasting), cluster, Working solutions,
increases system complexity
+ in the system, in light of bandwidth
(broadcasting) additional layer upn DHT, (additional layer)
+ and computing power
structural simplicity (DHTs)
-Network proximity: Can we take account the underlying
Global Network Positioning, Lighthouse
+Network proximity: Can we take account the underlying
Global Network Positioning, Lighthouse Increases system
complexity
network's properties better when
forming technique, trianqulated heuristics
overlay network (network-awareness for
performance) ?
-Locality: In the case on DHTs, can we take
account Constrained Load Balancing, using
+Locality: In the case on DHTs, can we take
account Constrained Load Balancing, using Working solutions
locality ?
network proximity for nearest
neighbor selection
-Hotspots: What will happen if some resource
Caching, multisource downloads
- is extremely popular and only
- one node is hosting it ?
+Hotspots: What will happen if some resource
Caching, multisource downloads, replication, For query hotspots,
caching and multisource downloads
+ is extremely popular and only
load balancing efficiently reduces
hotspots, for routing hotspots,
+ one node is hosting it ?
benefits are smaller
-Scalability: Broadcasting doesn't scale when
performing Super peers, peer clusters, mutual
- searches
index caching
+Scalability: Broadcasting doesn't scale when
performing Super peers, peer clusters, mutual Better
scalability, but not comparable
+ searches
index caching to DHTs
-Programming guidelines: Set of programming
guidelines/frameworks Common frameworks and APIs
- is needed for better interoperability
between
+Programming guidelines: Set of programming
guidelines/frameworks Common frameworks and APIs
Common framework/API is still missing, a lot
+ is needed for better interoperability
between of proposal has been
made
different systems
-Access Control: Can we define access control
levels - -
- in peer-to-peer network ?
+Access Control: Can we define access control
levels - Working
solutions are missing, mainly
+ in peer-to-peer network ?
because they are
hard/not practically realizable
-System in flux: Nodes join and leave system
constantly: Half-life phenomenon (for analysis),
- load balancing, efficiency ?
simple overlay and construction protocol
-
-Inconsistent behaviour: Hostile node could act
correctly with Public keys, digital signatures Not
practical approach
+System in flux: Nodes join and leave system
constantly: Half-life phenomenon (for analysis), Initial
theoretical anasysis has been created, but
+ load balancing, efficiency ?
simple overlay and construction protocol not comprehensive model
for analysing different
+
system states
+
+Inconsistent behaviour: Hostile node could act
correctly with Public keys, digital signatures Not
practical approach/working proposal created yet
its neighbors, but incorrectly with
other
-Hostile groups: Joining node may join parallel
network, Use trusted nodes, based on
+Hostile groups: Joining node may join parallel
network, Use trusted nodes, based on Not 100% sure
if Centreal Authority is missing
formed a group of hostile nodes
history information
-External threats: Viruses, troijans, sniffers
- -
+External threats: Viruses, troijans, sniffers
Data integrity/authenticity, distributed Not much research has
been done on this
+
antivirus software
-Illegal overlay construction: Hostile node(s) controls the
construction Cryptography
+Illegal overlay construction: Hostile node(s) controls the
construction Cryptography, key infrastructure Not
practical approach/working proposal created yet
of the network
+
+Comprehensive simulations/analysis Ability to simulate whole p2p network's
usage Use same techniques as simulating/analysing Only small subset of
peer-to-peer networks has been
+of peer-to-peer network: patterns, network traffics, flux state
etc the Internet able to analyse,
because of ad hoc properties of
+
network, more poweful
solutions needed
+
- [Gzz-commits] gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu researc..., Hermanni Hyytiälä, 2003/02/05
- [Gzz-commits] gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu researc..., Hermanni Hyytiälä, 2003/02/05
- [Gzz-commits] gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu researc..., Hermanni Hyytiälä, 2003/02/05
- [Gzz-commits] gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu researc..., Hermanni Hyytiälä, 2003/02/06
- [Gzz-commits] gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu researc..., Hermanni Hyytiälä, 2003/02/10
- [Gzz-commits] gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu researc..., Hermanni Hyytiälä, 2003/02/10
- [Gzz-commits] gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu researc..., Hermanni Hyytiälä, 2003/02/10
- [Gzz-commits] gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu researc...,
Hermanni Hyytiälä <=
- [Gzz-commits] gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu researc..., Hermanni Hyytiälä, 2003/02/11
- [Gzz-commits] gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu researc..., Hermanni Hyytiälä, 2003/02/13