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Re: The Perils of Pluggability (was: capability authentication)

From: Jonathan S. Shapiro
Subject: Re: The Perils of Pluggability (was: capability authentication)
Date: Mon, 10 Oct 2005 09:16:02 -0400

On Mon, 2005-10-10 at 13:38 +0200, Alfred M. Szmidt wrote:

In some cases this is true. In some cases it is probably less true than
we would like to believe
>    So: plugability is good, and necessary, but there are places where
>    it is a very bad idea, and the proc server is a good example of
>    where it is bad.
> I strongly disagree, me running my own proc server will not affect
> anyone, unless they say that they trust my proc server.  And I cannot
> tell the other user to trust it.

The problem isn't really trusting your proc server. The problem is that
any time I call a process *created* by your proc server I am trusting
your proc server, and this means that I have to authenticate the process
abstraction itself before I can call anything.

All of these authentications are certainly possible, but in practice
they are too hard a burden and programmers do not do them.

Let me back up: what functionality is provided by instantiating a new
proc server? Perhaps there is a design that can achieve this securely.


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