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Re: Clarification (was: Re: Challenge: Find potential use cases for non-


From: Michal Suchanek
Subject: Re: Clarification (was: Re: Challenge: Find potential use cases for non-trivial confinement
Date: Fri, 19 May 2006 15:11:56 +0200

On 5/4/06, Marcus Brinkmann <address@hidden> wrote:
At Wed, 3 May 2006 20:39:24 +0200,
"Michal Suchanek" <address@hidden> wrote:
> Now if isolation is what marcus does not want I have one use case he
> himself mentioned a few times: the instantiation of user sessions.
> Here the administrator uses a constructor to create isolated
> processes. If he did not the user sessions would be inside his session
> and he could observe them.

This is readily replaced by a slightly different mechanism: The system
administrator invokes a service (provided by the machine holder[1]) to
create a session.  The root process of the user session is then a
sibling to the root session of the admin session in the process
hierarchy.

Note that the nominal machine holder is always able, at least in
principle, to observe the user.  This is true irregardless if the
machine holder is a local person, or the provider of the "trusted
computing" component.

[1] I am tempted to say "machine owner".  In the case of "trusted
computing" however, it is not ownership that is transfered, but almost
complete control.  So, "owner" is not exactly right and I need a new
word that is not quite as strong.

> In my view reducing the number of constructors from potentionally
> limited only by system memory to exactly one does not eliminate the
> concept of isolation (ie the software that wants it may request a
> separate user session for itself). So it is a needless limitation.

However, it is not isolation that is under discussion but isolation
and confinement at the same time.


I meant isolation to be confinement and encapsulation at the same time.

Anyway, I think you are attacking the issue from the wrong angle. The
DRM distributors are concerned about the encapsulation of their code.
We are concerned about confinement.

Writing a system that is deliberately broken (and can be fixed) so
that it allows either encapsulation or confinement but not both at the
same time would do little for our cause. The DRM vendors would require
encapsulation, and would not care about confinement.

That way we only make the use of DRM software less secure (and
priviledged because only an administrator can install it).

Thanks

Michal

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