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[Lynx-dev] Regarding: Null Prefix Attacks Against SSL Certificates

From: Thorsten Glaser
Subject: [Lynx-dev] Regarding: Null Prefix Attacks Against SSL Certificates
Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2009 10:11:26 +0000 (UTC)


please update your report to state that Lynx does not need to be patched
since it already handles this gracefully:

┌──┤ interactive warning in the status line

┌──┤ message log excerpt
│8. Secure 256-bit TLSv1/SSLv3 (DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA) HTTP connection
│7. Certificate issued by: /C=ES/ST=Barcelona/L=Barcelona/O=IPS Certification 
Authority s.l./address@hidden C.I.F. B-B62210695/OU=ipsCA CLASEA1 Certification 
Authority/CN=ipsCA CLASEA1 Certification Authority/address@hidden
│6. UNVERIFIED connection to 

The ‘\x00’ is just not converted into a NUL byte. ‘*’ matching fails
since the host connected to doesn’t match either (a ‘\’ is invalid
in a hostname).

Sometimes, KISS pays off ☺

Tested on: MirOS httpd (MirOS #10semel), Lynx 2.8.7dev.8-MirOS
built with OpenSSL (someone on GNU/Linux should test this with
their GnuTLS crapware). I expect Lynx 2.8.7rel.1 (the current
release) to behave the same (in fact, updating Lynx in base is
next thing on my TODO).

  "Using Lynx is like wearing a really good pair of shades: cuts out
   the glare and harmful UV (ultra-vanity), and you feel so-o-o COOL."
                                         -- Henry Nelson, March 1999

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