In the 2.11 release we fixed CVE-2017-15268, which allowed the VNC websockets
server to consume arbitrary memory when a slow client was connected. I have
since discovered that this same type of problem can be triggered in several
other ways in the regular (non-websockets) VNC server. This patch series
attempts to fix this problem by limiting framebuffer updates and other data
sent from server to client. The mitigating factor is that you need to have
successfully authenticated with the VNC server to trigger these new flaws.
This new more general flaw is assigned CVE-2017-15124 by the Red Hat security
team.
The key patches containing the security fix are 9, 10, 11.
Since this code is incredibly subtle & hard to understand though, the first
8 patches do a bunch of independant cleanups/refactoring to make the security
fixes clearer. The last two patches are just some extra cleanup / help for
future maint.
Daniel P. Berrange (13):
ui: remove 'sync' parametr from vnc_update_client
ui: remove unreachable code in vnc_update_client
ui: remove redundant indentation in vnc_client_update
ui: avoid pointless VNC updates if framebuffer isn't dirty
ui: track how much decoded data we consumed when doing SASL encoding
ui: introduce enum to track VNC client framebuffer update request
state
ui: correctly reset framebuffer update state after processing dirty
regions
ui: refactor code for determining if an update should be sent to the
client
ui: fix VNC client throttling when audio capture is active
ui: fix VNC client throttling when forced update is requested
ui: place a hard cap on VNC server output buffer size
ui: add trace events related to VNC client throttling
ui: mix misleading comments & return types of VNC I/O helper methods
ui/trace-events | 7 ++
ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 16 ++-
ui/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 5 +-
ui/vnc-jobs.c | 5 +
ui/vnc.c | 320 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
ui/vnc.h | 28 ++++-
6 files changed, 277 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-)
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2.14.3