|Subject:||Re: [Social-discuss] Announcing P2P GNU Social|
|Date:||Sun, 11 Jul 2010 11:21:54 +0900|
On 10 July 2010 13:26, Ted Smith <address@hidden> wrote:It doesn't, though servers are free to encrypt the data before and/or
> It means that if your server (to be precise, your
> core) is cracked, or subpoenaed by the MAFIAA/ACTA-Empowered Sharing
> Police, it can give up no data that you haven't already decided is
> I don't think that StatusNet GNU Social makes that guarantee, even when
> it comes to private messaging. I would be very happy to be wrong.
after it's sent. The same applies for email. Two thoughts:
1. I welcome experiments using P2P networks for social networks, but
consider the human-level usability concerns. No matter what the
underlying technology is, you need a human-level addressing system
(the acid test for a good addressing scheme is the ability for one
person to be able to write down on a scrap of paper an address at
which someone else can contact them later). If you use webfinger (re:
email-like addresses), you can maintain compatibility with mainline
GNU Social, Status.net, Diaspora (i.e., OStatus), and Google Buzz
while providing forwards-compatibility to stronger privacy-based
So, as I understand it, this shared secret is simply a way of ensuring that Bob is really Bob and Alice is really Alice, and that they know eachother, not a key that is used to encrypt messages between Alice and Bob- correct?
- If Bob hasn’t authenticated against Alice’s server, then Bob’s server goes through the Webfinger auth process, generating a shared secret. If he already has, he’ll already have such a secret.
- Bob’s server uses the shared secret from the Webfinger auth process to retrieve Alice’s message.
2. Your threat model is incomplete. The data you've shared is private
not until *you* decide it's public, but until *someone you've shared
the data with* decides it's public (or is forced to make it public).
It's certainly true that the approach you describe is *more* secure
than the default approach, but it's important to remember that it's
not *completely* secure. Another way to think about this issue is to
consider what (deployment / payload) approaches provide strong
security over the default (OStatus-esque) approach, providing a local
maximum of utility AND security?
* There are approaches to using DHTs and either webs-of-trust or
bootstrapping methods to provide trusted DNS-independent lookups for
email addresses (and other addresses). See VIPR, MonkeySphere, and
RedPhone for ideas.
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