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bug#31946: 27.0.50; The NSM should warn about more TLS problems


From: Jimmy Yuen Ho Wong
Subject: bug#31946: 27.0.50; The NSM should warn about more TLS problems
Date: Sat, 30 Jun 2018 18:28:41 +0100

Here's the patch promised.

Summary of changes:

* 9 new checks added, some for securing Emacs builts with older GnuTLS
versions, some for bringing NSM checks to 2018.
* Individual checks are now suffixe'd by their cipher suite part. E.g.
dhe-kx for DHE key exchange, des-cipher for DES cipher, sha1-sig for
SHA1 signature.
* Protocal checks now return an error message instead of querying the
user directly.
* All protocol checks under the same network-security-level are
performed. All of the messages are then merged if any, and the user is
only prompt once after the protocol check for all problems found.
* nsm-query and nsm-query-user no longer takes extra args to format
messages. Formatted messages are now provided directly by the
individual checks.
* Fix RC4 check where it was previously checking for non-existent RC4
cipher from GnuTLS. GnuTLS actually calls RC4 ARCFOUR.
* Removed sha1 check as it is already covered by the intermediate SHA1 checks.
* DHE check now checks for < 1024 bit prime for 'medium and usage of
DHE for 'high and above, in addition to prime bit length.

Possible improvements:

* Check for TLS compression. I haven't looked into how to do this with
GnuTLS' API yet, but we should probably do this because CRIME and
BREACH.
* Check for TLS 1.0 usage and protocol downgrades? Today happens to be
the deadline to migrate to TLS 1.1+ for PCI DSS compliance, but the
reason seems to be POODLE, BEAST, CRIME, BREACH and Heartbleed and
downgrade to SSL. Mitigations for some of these are already in
existing checks, others may be covered by a compression check. Maybe
we should be paranoid about this? Also, I'm not sure how to check for
protocol downgrades with GnuTLS' API.
* Write some unit tests....

I've manually tested this patch a bit, but please give this patch a
look and see if I've missed anything. I need all the feedbacks I can
get for this.

Jimmy

On Fri, Jun 29, 2018 at 6:25 AM, Jimmy Yuen Ho Wong <address@hidden> wrote:
> Correction:
>
> This is the actualy cipher string I used
> "DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256".
>
> All 3 browsers fail to connect.
>
> On Fri, Jun 29, 2018 at 6:21 AM, Jimmy Yuen Ho Wong <address@hidden> wrote:
>> Update:
>>
>> I just tried with this node.js script:
>>
>> #! /usr/bin/env node
>>
>> const https = require('https');
>> const fs = require('fs');
>>
>> const options = {
>>   key: fs.readFileSync('ryans-key.pem'),
>>   cert: fs.readFileSync('ryans-cert.pem'),
>>   ciphers: "DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
>> };
>>
>> https.createServer(options, (req, res) => {
>>   res.writeHead(200);
>>   res.end('hello world\n');
>> }).listen(8000);
>>
>> Chrome gave me a ERR_SSL_VERSION_OR_CIPHER_MISMATCH, Firefox gave me a
>> SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP, Safari just told me it can't establish a
>> connection.
>>
>> Conversely, changing DHE to ECDHE will at least show me the warning
>> screen for a self-signed cert, so I'm fairly certain now that these 3
>> browsers have removed DHE KX.
>>
>>
>> Heads up:
>>
>> I'm adding about 10 new checks into NSM ATM. Will send a early preview
>> patch here later today for feedback.
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Jun 28, 2018 at 7:15 PM, Jimmy Yuen Ho Wong <address@hidden> wrote:
>>> The Telemetry data[1] from Mozilla in bug report 1227519[2] suggests
>>> DHE usage is very low for HTTP. No data for any other protocol.
>>>
>>> I just used Wireshark on Chrome and Firefox on macOS, they all seem to
>>> advertise DH and DHE cipher suites in Client Hello for TLS 1.2, they
>>> even advertise CBC mode ciphers too. While I'm not sure about Firefox,
>>> surely Chrome has removed DHE_SHA KX and CBC modes according to
>>> ChromeStatus[3]?
>>>
>>>
>>> [1]: https://tlscanary.mozilla.org/runs/2018-01-25-01-21-44/
>>> [2]: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1227519
>>> [3]: https://www.chromestatus.com/features#tls
>>>
>>> On Thu, Jun 28, 2018 at 6:01 PM, Lars Ingebrigtsen <address@hidden> wrote:
>>>> Jimmy Yuen Ho Wong <address@hidden> writes:
>>>>
>>>>>> I can't see that that web page mentions Diffie-Hellman at all?
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Click on the individual browsers.
>>>>
>>>> I see.
>>>>
>>>>> SSLLabs only reports that Firefox 59 / Win 7 has dropped support for
>>>>> DHE_RSA in the UA capabilities page[1], but client test[2] still shows
>>>>> it is supported, so does Chrome and Safari. I don't understand what's
>>>>> going on there. Could that list in in client test be static? Or that
>>>>> browsers still advertise their support for DHE_RSA when in fact they
>>>>> don't? Might have to get on a server and log out the TLS handshake to
>>>>> see what's actually going on...
>>>>>
>>>>> [1]: https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/clients.html
>>>>> [2]: https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/viewMyClient.html
>>>>
>>>> My
>>>>
>>>> Chromium        66.0.3359.117 (Developer Build) built on Debian 9.4,
>>>> running on Debian 9.4 (64-bit)
>>>>
>>>> on the viewMyClient reports not supporting DHE-RSA.
>>>>
>>>> Confusing.  :-)
>>>>
>>>> I tried finding a web site that says how many sites do not support ECDHE
>>>> as key exchange, and only found something from 2014 that says that was
>>>> 60%...
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> (domestic pets only, the antidote for overdose, milk.)
>>>>    bloggy blog: http://lars.ingebrigtsen.no

Attachment: 0001-Modern-protocol-checks-for-NSM.patch
Description: Binary data


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