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Re: [Bug-gnuzilla] Browser Fingerprints Solution

From: Loic J. Duros
Subject: Re: [Bug-gnuzilla] Browser Fingerprints Solution
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 18:17:26 +0000
User-agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/24.3.50 (gnu/linux)

Julian <address@hidden> writes:

> On 03/27/2014 05:52 PM, address@hidden wrote:
>> I am writing to stress out the need of a solution, integrated with 
>> icecat, to use false browser fingerprints and result in opting-out
>> from surveillance.
> Nothing wrong with adding anti-fingerprinting to IceCat, but I just
> want to point out that the best way to stop fingerprinting (and
> surveillance in general) is to use the Tor Browser Bundle at its
> default settings. IceCat can never be as good at stopping tracking as
> that, for various reasons.

Actually, if we are talking about fingerprinting strictly rather than
pure anonimity, I'm not sure how the tor browser fares (I remember the
tor browser draft mentioned fingerprinting at some point.) Anything that
modifies the behavior of your browser has an effect on
fingerprinting. This includes the measures (addons, fixes) taken to
block third-party requests, disable a global js variable, and the like.
The more the browser is out of the ordinary the more unique its
fingerprint. The best way to get a browser to have a more common
fingerprint is to have it masquerade as a common browser, running in a
common operating system, with the expected behavior of a browser, etc,

Running stuff that will make your browser more private will make your
fingerprint more unique... So it's just a matter of finding the right
balance (you still don't want to leak private data), or finding a way to
mess with the values/mechanisms used for fingerprinting.

Anyway, this is just my personal opinion which I haven't verified
recently (more like a year and a half ago.)

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