Re: [Bug-wget] Wget - acess list bypass / race condition PoC

[Tim Rühsen]

On Mittwoch, 17. August 2016 13:37:33 CEST Ander Juaristi wrote:
> I was thinking we could rename php extensions to phps, but it's all the
> same thing in the end, and even better, since the former applies to any
> kind of file and I've seen some broken servers that actually run phps files.
> 
> So, this is what I would do:
> 
>     1. Write temporary files with 600 perms, and make sure they're owned
> by the running user and group. qmail goes even further [1] by not
> letting root run, but I would not do that here.
>     2. Use mkostemp() to generate a unique filename and give it a
> harmless extension (like Mozilla's .part). We already have unique_name()
> in utils.c, altough it returns the file name untouched if it does not
> exist. We should do some research on whether we could reuse parts of it.

Giuseppe and I  have a working patch that is basically like this. We are still 
discussing the details (mkstemp extension, fixed extension, both or maybe a 
mkdtemp directory where we put all the temp files).

As soon as we agree, we'll post the patch here for further discussion/review.

>     3. Place them in /tmp, or even better, in ~/.wget-tempfiles, or
> something like that.

/tmp often is on a separate filesystem (e.g. RAM disk) with limited space.
This could open another (DOS) attack vector.

You do not always have a home directory when running Wget.

> There's a patch by Tim somewhere in this list that already does 1 (but
> please, remove the braces ;D).
> 
> It also comes to my mind, instead of writing each temp file to its own
> file, we could put them all in the same file (with O_APPEND). But a) we
> need a way to tell them apart later, and b) it may cause problems in
> NFS, according to open(2).
> 
> [1] http://cr.yp.to/qmail/guarantee.html
> 
> On 15/08/16 18:31, Tim Rühsen wrote:
> > On Montag, 15. August 2016 10:02:55 CEST moparisthebest wrote:
> >> Hello,
> >> 
> >> I find it extremely hard to call this a wget vulnerability when SO many
> >> other things are wrong with that 'vulnerable code' implementation it
> >> isn't even funny:
> >> 
> >> 1. The image_importer.php script takes a single argument, why would it
> >> download with the recursive switch turned on?  Isn't that clearly a bug
> >> in the php script?  Has a php script like this that downloads all files
> >> from a website of a particular extension ever been observed in the wild?
> >> 
> >> 2. A *well* configured server would have a whitelist of .php files it
> >> will execute, making it immune to this.  A *decently* configured server
> >> would always at a minimum make sure they don't execute code in
> >> directories with user provided uploads in them.  So it's additionally a
> >> bug in the server configuration. (incidentally every php package I've
> >> downloaded has at minimum a .htaccess in upload directories to prevent
> >> this kind of thing with apache)
> >> 
> >> It seems to me like there has always been plenty of ways to shoot
> >> yourself in the foot with PHP, and this is just another iteration on a
> >> theme.
> > 
> > Hi,
> > 
> > this is absolutely true and your points were the first things that came to
> > my mind when reading the original post.
> > 
> > But there is also non-obvious wget behavior in creating those (temp) files
> > in the filesystem. And there is also a long history of attack vectors
> > introduced by temp files as well.
> > 
> > Today the maintainers discussed a few possible fixes, all with pros and
> > cons. I would like to list them here, in case someone likes to comment:
> > 
> > 1. Rewrite code to keep temp files in memory.
> > Too complex, needs a redesign of wget. And has been done for wget2...
> > 
> > 2. Add a harmless extension to the file names.
> > Possible name collision with wanted files.
> > Possible name length issues, have to be worked around.
> > 
> > 3. Using file mode 0 (no flags at all).
> > Short vulnerability when changing modes to write/read the data.
> > 
> > 4. Using O_TMPFILE for open().
> > Just for Linux, not for every filesystem available.
> > 
> > 5. Using mkostemp().
> > Possible name collision with wanted files (which would be unexpectedly
> > named as *.1 in case of a collision). At least the chance for a collision
> > seems very low.
> > 
> > Any thoughts or other ideas ?
> > 
> > Regards, Tim

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