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Integer overflows in parse_content_range() and gethttp()
From: |
vulnerabilityspotter |
Subject: |
Integer overflows in parse_content_range() and gethttp() |
Date: |
Sat, 24 Feb 2024 22:38:16 +0000 |
Security Vulnerability Report
File: src/http.c
Functions: parse_content_range() and gethttp()
Vulnerability Type: Integer Overflow
Location: Lines 936, 942, 955 and 3739
Severity: High
Description:
In the parse_content_range() function, at lines 936, 942, 955, there exists a
vulnerability related to an integer overflow. The vulnerability arises from the
calculation of the variable num, which is assigned the value of
num = 10 * num + (*hdr - '0');
Both the multiplication and addition can lead to an integer overflow, and lead
to unexpected behavior, due to the lack of validation.
Furthermore similarly to
[curl/curl#12983](https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/12983), at line 3739 of
function gethttp(), the calculation of the contlen variable can also overflow:
contlen = last_byte_pos - first_byte_pos + 1;
Exploitation Scenario:
An attacker may craft a malicious request with carefully chosen values in the
Content-Range header, triggering an integer overflow during the calculation of
num and contlen. This could potentially lead to various security issues, such
as memory corruption, buffer overflows, or unexpected behavior, depending on
how the num and contlen variables is subsequently used.
Impact:
The impact of this vulnerability could be severe, potentially leading to:
Memory Corruption: If the calculated num and contlen value are used to allocate
memory or perform operations such as copying data, an integer overflow could
result in memory corruption, leading to crashes or arbitrary code execution.
Security Bypass: In scenarios where num and contlen value are used to enforce
boundaries or permissions, an attacker may exploit the integer overflow to
bypass security checks or gain unauthorized access to sensitive resources.
Denial of Service (DoS): A carefully crafted request exploiting the integer
overflow could cause the application to enter an unexpected state or consume
excessive resources, leading to a denial of service condition.
Recommendations:
Bounds Checking: Implement proper bounds checking to ensure that the values of
num and contlen are within acceptable ranges before performing calculations.
Safe Arithmetic Operations: Consider using safer arithmetic operations or
alternative calculation methods to prevent integer overflows, especially when
dealing with potentially large or close-to-boundary values.
Input Validation: Validate input parameters to ensure they adhere to expected
ranges and constraints before performing calculations.
Error Handling: Implement robust error handling mechanisms to gracefully handle
scenarios where input parameters result in unexpected or invalid calculations.
Severity Justification:
The presence of an integer overflow vulnerability at lines 936, 942, 955 and
3739 poses a high risk to the security and stability of the application.
Exploitation of this vulnerability could lead to severe consequences, including
memory corruption, security bypass, or denial of service conditions.
Affected Versions:
This vulnerability affects all versions of the application that include the
vulnerable parse_content_range() and gethttp() functions.
References:
OWASP Integer Overflow
CWE-190: Integer Overflow or Wraparound
CERT Secure Coding - INT32-C
Conclusion:
The presence of an integer overflow vulnerability at lines 936, 942, 955 in the
parse_content_range() function and line 3739 of gethttp() poses a high risk to
the security and stability of the application. It is imperative to address this
vulnerability promptly by implementing appropriate bounds checking and error
handling mechanisms to prevent potential exploitation and associated security
risks.
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