On Wed, Mar 18, 2009 at 12:19 AM, Igor Pirnovar
<aipir@sympatico.ca> wrote:
Hi Tim,
Let me add that the above security bridge is not only manifested when you set the {{ atomically: YES }} but also when you do not use this feature!
Torli
On Tue, 2009-03-17 at 19:18 -0400, Torli Birnbauer wrote:
On Tue, 2009-03-17 at 23:38 +0100, Tim Kack wrote:
Hi all,
Yes - I am not sure if this is intended behavior or not.
The file is created/written to like this:
1. Create a unique file
2. Write string to that file
3.Using glibc Rename function to rename the unique file to the old file. (NSData.m:1054)
4. Set the attributes on the new unique file
The docs for rename(const char *oldname, const char *newname) function says that:
"If oldname is not a directory, then any existing file named newname is removed during the naming operation."
I tried to figure out what is _intended_ to happen but I have not found anything so far.
I will open up a bug on Savannah.
// Tim
2009/3/17 Torli Birnbauer <gootobi@gmail.com>
I have just started to learn the GNUstep's development environment and I have in my very first program stumbled across a serious security problem in the way Objective-C handles IO. Obviously, Objective-C does not honour Unix file permissions. You can reproduce this problem on Unix/Linux systems by setting {{ chmod 000 /some/dir/your.data }}, and then run the example program in the GNUstep documentation page (Base Programming Manual/The Objective-C Language) under "2.8.5 Loading and Saving Strings" by setting the path to {{ /some/dir/your.data }}.
Torli
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