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Subject: |
Source downloader accepts X.509 certificate for incorrect domain |
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Date: |
Wed, 21 Jun 2017 02:17:52 -0400 |
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User-agent: |
Mutt/1.8.3 (2017-05-23) |
While working on some package updates, I found that the source code
downloader will accept an X.509 certificate for an incorrect site.
Here is what happens:
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$ ./pre-inst-env guix build -S opus-tools --check
@ build-started
/gnu/store/nn93hkik8kvrigcf2pvmym01zg7jqm4v-opus-tools-0.1.10.tar.gz.drv -
x86_64-linux
/var/log/guix/drvs/nn//93hkik8kvrigcf2pvmym01zg7jqm4v-opus-tools-0.1.10.tar.gz.drv.bz2
Starting download of
/gnu/store/0js62s7pz9gfcdsd1n764w91mhhwkws4-opus-tools-0.1.10.tar.gz
From https://downloads.xiph.org/releases/opus/opus-tools-0.1.10.tar.gz...
….1.10.tar.gz 305KiB 822KiB/s 00:00 [####################] 100.0%
warning: rewriting hashes in
`/gnu/store/vdpyfqzp0kkjpxr79fq3an7j4s4vkz0h-opus-tools-0.1.10.tar.gz'; cross
fingers
/gnu/store/vdpyfqzp0kkjpxr79fq3an7j4s4vkz0h-opus-tools-0.1.10.tar.gz
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Here is an example of what I think should happen in this case:
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$ curl https://downloads.xiph.org/releases/opus/opus-tools-0.1.10.tar.gz
curl: (51) SSL: certificate subject name (osuosl.org) does not match target
host name 'downloads.xiph.org'
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And this is what Firefox says:
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downloads.xiph.org uses an invalid security certificate.
The certificate is only valid for the following names:
osuosl.org, *.osuosl.org
Error code: SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN
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signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
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--- Begin Message ---
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Subject: |
Re: bug#27437: Source downloader accepts X.509 certificate for incorrect domain |
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Date: |
Thu, 27 Jul 2017 21:34:29 +0200 |
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User-agent: |
mu4e 0.9.18; emacs 25.2.1 |
Ludovic Courtès <address@hidden> writes:
> Ricardo Wurmus <address@hidden> skribis:
>
>>>From 44b8f1c04713d11601d964ecfbe2fc248a15e7c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>> From: Ricardo Wurmus <address@hidden>
>> Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2017 09:24:58 +0200
>> Subject: [PATCH] doc: Encourage signature verification.
>>
>> * doc/contributing.texi (Submitting Patches): Remind contributors to verify
>> cryptographic signatures.
>> ---
>> doc/contributing.texi | 6 ++++++
>> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/doc/contributing.texi b/doc/contributing.texi
>> index 925c584e4..0073f2451 100644
>> --- a/doc/contributing.texi
>> +++ b/doc/contributing.texi
>> @@ -334,6 +334,12 @@ updates for a given software package in a single place
>> and have them
>> affect the whole system---something that bundled copies prevent.
>>
>> @item
>> +If the authors of the packaged software provide a cryptographic
>> +signature for the release tarball, make an effort to verify the
>> +authenticity of the archive. For a detached GPG signature file this
>> +would be done with the @code{gpg --verify} command.
>
> I would make it the very first item of the check list.
>
> If that’s fine with you, please push and maybe close the bug!
Looks like I’ve already pushed this a while back. I’ll move it up to
the top of the list. (And I’m closing this bug.)
--
Ricardo
GPG: BCA6 89B6 3655 3801 C3C6 2150 197A 5888 235F ACAC
https://elephly.net
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