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[debbugs-tracker] bug#31833: closed ([PATCH 2/2] gnu: OpenSSL 1.1.0: Fix


From: GNU bug Tracking System
Subject: [debbugs-tracker] bug#31833: closed ([PATCH 2/2] gnu: OpenSSL 1.1.0: Fix CVE-2018-{0495, 0732}.)
Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2018 16:07:01 +0000

Your message dated Mon, 18 Jun 2018 12:06:05 -0400
with message-id <address@hidden>
and subject line Re: [bug#31833] Updated patch for OpenSSL 1.1.0 
CVE-2018-{0495,0732}
has caused the debbugs.gnu.org bug report #31833,
regarding [PATCH 2/2] gnu: OpenSSL 1.1.0: Fix CVE-2018-{0495,0732}.
to be marked as done.

(If you believe you have received this mail in error, please contact
address@hidden)


-- 
31833: http://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi/bugreport.cgi?bug=31833
GNU Bug Tracking System
Contact address@hidden with problems
--- Begin Message --- Subject: [PATCH 2/2] gnu: OpenSSL 1.1.0: Fix CVE-2018-{0495,0732}. Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2018 16:43:15 -0400
* gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0495.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0732.patch: New files.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add them.
* gnu/packages/tls.scm (openssl-next)[source]: Use them.
---
 gnu/local.mk                                  |   2 +
 .../patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0495.patch | 167 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0732.patch |  50 ++++++
 gnu/packages/tls.scm                          |   4 +-
 4 files changed, 222 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0495.patch
 create mode 100644 gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0732.patch

diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk
index e9d572922..27fb18a05 100644
--- a/gnu/local.mk
+++ b/gnu/local.mk
@@ -975,6 +975,8 @@ dist_patch_DATA =                                           
\
   %D%/packages/patches/openssl-runpath.patch                   \
   %D%/packages/patches/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0495.patch       \
   %D%/packages/patches/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0732.patch       \
+  %D%/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0495.patch       \
+  %D%/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0732.patch       \
   %D%/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-c-rehash-in.patch         \
   %D%/packages/patches/openssl-c-rehash-in.patch               \
   %D%/packages/patches/orpheus-cast-errors-and-includes.patch  \
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0495.patch 
b/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0495.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6b7de5d64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0495.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+Fix CVE-2018-0495:
+
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-0495
+https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/our-research/technical-advisory-return-of-the-hidden-number-problem/
+
+Patch copied from upstream source repository:
+
+https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/0c27d793745c7837b13646302b6890a556b7017a
+
+From 0c27d793745c7837b13646302b6890a556b7017a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <address@hidden>
+Date: Fri, 25 May 2018 12:10:13 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Add blinding to an ECDSA signature
+
+Keegan Ryan (NCC Group) has demonstrated a side channel attack on an
+ECDSA signature operation. During signing the signer calculates:
+
+s:= k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order
+
+The addition operation above provides a sufficient signal for a
+flush+reload attack to derive the private key given sufficient signature
+operations.
+
+As a mitigation (based on a suggestion from Keegan) we add blinding to
+the operation so that:
+
+s := k^-1 * blind^-1 (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order
+
+Since this attack is a localhost side channel only no CVE is assigned.
+
+Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <address@hidden>
+---
+ CHANGES                |  4 +++
+ crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ 2 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
+index bfd0bcd402..b749d9ed96 100644
+--- a/CHANGES
++++ b/CHANGES
+@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@
+ 
+  Changes between 1.1.0h and 1.1.0i [xx XXX xxxx]
+ 
++  *) Add blinding to an ECDSA signature to protect against side channel 
attacks
++     discovered by Keegan Ryan (NCC Group).
++     [Matt Caswell]
++
+   *) When unlocking a pass phrase protected PEM file or PKCS#8 container, we
+      now allow empty (zero character) pass phrases.
+      [Richard Levitte]
+diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c b/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
+index 72e2f0f28b..449be0e92a 100644
+--- a/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
++++ b/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
+@@ -210,7 +210,8 @@ ECDSA_SIG *ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, 
int dgst_len,
+                                EC_KEY *eckey)
+ {
+     int ok = 0, i;
+-    BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *s, *m = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
++    BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *s, *m = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *blind = NULL;
++    BIGNUM *blindm = NULL;
+     const BIGNUM *order, *ckinv;
+     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+     const EC_GROUP *group;
+@@ -243,8 +244,18 @@ ECDSA_SIG *ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, 
int dgst_len,
+     }
+     s = ret->s;
+ 
+-    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL ||
+-        (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL || (m = BN_new()) == NULL) {
++    ctx = BN_CTX_secure_new();
++    if (ctx == NULL) {
++        ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++        goto err;
++    }
++
++    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
++    tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
++    m = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
++    blind = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
++    blindm = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
++    if (blindm == NULL) {
+         ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+         goto err;
+     }
+@@ -284,18 +295,64 @@ ECDSA_SIG *ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char 
*dgst, int dgst_len,
+             }
+         }
+ 
+-        if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, priv_key, ret->r, order, ctx)) {
++        /*
++         * The normal signature calculation is:
++         *
++         *   s := k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order
++         *
++         * We will blind this to protect against side channel attacks
++         *
++         *   s := k^-1 * blind^-1 * (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod 
order
++         */
++
++        /* Generate a blinding value */
++        do {
++            if (!BN_rand(blind, BN_num_bits(order) - 1, BN_RAND_TOP_ANY,
++                         BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY))
++                goto err;
++        } while (BN_is_zero(blind));
++        BN_set_flags(blind, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
++        BN_set_flags(blindm, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
++        BN_set_flags(tmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
++
++        /* tmp := blind * priv_key * r mod order */
++        if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, blind, priv_key, order, ctx)) {
+             ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+             goto err;
+         }
+-        if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, m, order)) {
++        if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, ret->r, order, ctx)) {
+             ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+             goto err;
+         }
++
++        /* blindm := blind * m mod order */
++        if (!BN_mod_mul(blindm, blind, m, order, ctx)) {
++            ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
++            goto err;
++        }
++
++        /* s : = (blind * priv_key * r) + (blind * m) mod order */
++        if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, blindm, order)) {
++            ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
++            goto err;
++        }
++
++        /* s:= s * blind^-1 mod order */
++        if (BN_mod_inverse(blind, blind, order, ctx) == NULL) {
++            ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
++            goto err;
++        }
++        if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, blind, order, ctx)) {
++            ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
++            goto err;
++        }
++
++        /* s := s * k^-1 mod order */
+         if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, ckinv, order, ctx)) {
+             ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+             goto err;
+         }
++
+         if (BN_is_zero(s)) {
+             /*
+              * if kinv and r have been supplied by the caller don't to
+@@ -317,9 +374,8 @@ ECDSA_SIG *ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, 
int dgst_len,
+         ECDSA_SIG_free(ret);
+         ret = NULL;
+     }
++    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+     BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+-    BN_clear_free(m);
+-    BN_clear_free(tmp);
+     BN_clear_free(kinv);
+     return ret;
+ }
+-- 
+2.17.1
+
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0732.patch 
b/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0732.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dfea6e7d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0732.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+Fix CVE-2018-0732:
+
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-0732
+
+Patch copied from upstream source repository:
+
+https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/ea7abeeabf92b7aca160bdd0208636d4da69f4f4
+
+From ea7abeeabf92b7aca160bdd0208636d4da69f4f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Guido Vranken <address@hidden>
+Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2018 19:38:54 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Reject excessively large primes in DH key generation.
+
+CVE-2018-0732
+
+Signed-off-by: Guido Vranken <address@hidden>
+
+(cherry picked from commit 91f7361f47b082ae61ffe1a7b17bb2adf213c7fe)
+
+Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <address@hidden>
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <address@hidden>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6457)
+---
+ crypto/dh/dh_key.c | 7 ++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+index fce9ff47f3..58003d7087 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+@@ -78,10 +78,15 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
+     int ok = 0;
+     int generate_new_key = 0;
+     unsigned l;
+-    BN_CTX *ctx;
++    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+     BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
+     BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
+ 
++    if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        DHerr(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+     ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+     if (ctx == NULL)
+         goto err;
+-- 
+2.17.1
+
diff --git a/gnu/packages/tls.scm b/gnu/packages/tls.scm
index a582fb152..3912d9e2f 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/tls.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/tls.scm
@@ -415,7 +415,9 @@ required structures.")
                         (string-append "ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/old/";
                                        (string-trim-right version 
char-set:letter)
                                        "/" name "-" version ".tar.gz")))
-              (patches (search-patches "openssl-1.1.0-c-rehash-in.patch"))
+              (patches (search-patches "openssl-1.1.0-c-rehash-in.patch"
+                                       "openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0495.patch"
+                                       "openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0732.patch"))
               (sha256
                (base32
                 "05x509lccqjscgyi935z809pwfm708islypwhmjnb6cyvrn64daq"))))
-- 
2.17.1




--- End Message ---
--- Begin Message --- Subject: Re: [bug#31833] Updated patch for OpenSSL 1.1.0 CVE-2018-{0495,0732} Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2018 12:06:05 -0400 User-agent: Mutt/1.10.0 (2018-05-17)
On Sat, Jun 16, 2018 at 06:09:05PM +0200, Ludovic Court├Ęs wrote:
> Hi Leo,
> 
> Leo Famulari <address@hidden> skribis:
> 
> > From d8952c1d3b2ebe885ed6b6f316dcce09ee8eeba1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> > From: Leo Famulari <address@hidden>
> > Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2018 16:30:57 -0400
> > Subject: [PATCH] gnu: OpenSSL 1.1.0: Fix CVE-2018-{0495,0732}.
> >
> > * gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0495.patch,
> > gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0732.patch: New files.
> > * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add them.
> > * gnu/packages/tls.scm (openssl-next)[source]: Use them.
> 
> LGTM, thank you!

Thanks! Pushed as 9f162c0ab42d8adecc1e23375ce8cb8090714399

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