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[debbugs-tracker] bug#34632: closed ([PATCH 0/2] Change from GSS to MIT-

From: GNU bug Tracking System
Subject: [debbugs-tracker] bug#34632: closed ([PATCH 0/2] Change from GSS to MIT-KRB5.)
Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 18:16:02 +0000

Your message dated Tue, 14 May 2019 20:15:36 +0200
with message-id <address@hidden>
and subject line Re: [bug#34632] [PATCH 0/2] Change from GSS to MIT-KRB5.
has caused the debbugs.gnu.org bug report #34632,
regarding [PATCH 0/2] Change from GSS to MIT-KRB5.
to be marked as done.

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34632: http://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi/bugreport.cgi?bug=34632
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--- Begin Message --- Subject: [PATCH 0/2] Change from GSS to MIT-KRB5. Date: Sat, 23 Feb 2019 17:20:42 +0100
The GNU Generic Security Service and friends have been unmaintained for
many years now: <https://www.gnu.org/software/gss/>.

Since these libraries are security-critical, it would be good to switch
to maintained implementations.  WDYT?

Marius Bakke (2):
  gnu: gsasl: Use the MIT Kerberos implementation instead of GSS.
  gnu: curl: Build against MIT Kerberos instead of GSS.

 gnu/packages/curl.scm  | 10 ++++++----
 gnu/packages/gsasl.scm |  4 +++-
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)


--- End Message ---
--- Begin Message --- Subject: Re: [bug#34632] [PATCH 0/2] Change from GSS to MIT-KRB5. Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 20:15:36 +0200 User-agent: Notmuch/0.28.3 (https://notmuchmail.org) Emacs/26.2 (x86_64-pc-linux-gnu)
Hi Maxim,

Maxim Cournoyer <address@hidden> writes:

> Hello,
> Leo Famulari <address@hidden> writes:
>> On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 11:43:26PM -0400, Maxim Cournoyer wrote:
>>> Unmaintained on what ground? The website doesn't list fresh news,
>>> but the latest release was made in 2014 [1], and the maintainer has made
>>> changes to the Debian package last time in 2017 [2]. I wouldn't say it's
>>> unmaintained until the maintainer says so or CVEs pile up unfixed (which
>>> there aren't).
>> Considering the rate of vulnerability discovery in MIT Kerberos [0] I
>> think that, if GSS was being examined to the same degree, we would learn
>> of many serious bugs. Any significant C codebase of this age will have
>> such bugs. But unfortunately GSS hasn't received as much scrutiny.
>> [0]
>> https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=krb5
> Just FYI,
> I had ping'd the GSS mailing list with this message:
> http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/help-gss/2019-03/msg00001.html, but
> there haven't been a reply (yet).
> So it looks like it was a wise decision to make the switch! Sorry for
> doubting, eh!

Thank you very much for checking with upstream :-)

I was on the fence about this switch myself, and submitted this patch
hoping for feedback along these lines.

It would be great to get Shishi and GSS into Googles OSS-Fuzz and
similar so that we can be more confident in the implementation.

For now I've pushed these patches in 996186b..828d376.

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