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Subject: |
Grafting breaks libraries signatures |
Date: |
Tue, 27 Aug 2024 14:46:40 +0400 |
TLDR: libcamera checks the signatures of its own libraries, when loading
them, grafts are enabled by default in Guix, grafted libraries fails to
pass the check.
The full story:
For the last a few days I was updating and fixing libcamera package.
The last problem I faced with it is invalid signatures:
[0:44:16.200646504] [17247] DEBUG IPAManager ipa_manager.cpp:316 IPA module
/gnu/store/pfh7adzzy8akkqsjj4wlnmvmbzmrfbvk-libcamera-0.3.1/lib/libcamera/ipa_soft_simple.so
signature is not valid
The full log:
https://paste.sr.ht/~abcdw/09e6d4aa66c8fb70a1e8e7e91bfef4cae5aa4e24#cam2.log
I thought it was because of grafts and tried to build it with
--no-grafts, it didn't help. After that I realized that the signature
created during install phase and before strip phases. I added a phase
after 'shrink-runpath and it helped:
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/guix.git/commit/?id=4a19fe41c3
qcam now shows the image, after that I removed --no-grafts flag and
built the package again and the problem came back (now because of
grafts).
The issue with related discussion in libcamera backtracker:
https://bugs.libcamera.org/show_bug.cgi?id=231
How we can solve or workaround this problem?
--
Best regards,
Andrew Tropin
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--- Begin Message ---
Subject: |
Re: bug#72828: Grafting breaks libcamera signatures |
Date: |
Thu, 05 Sep 2024 10:46:03 +0400 |
On 2024-09-04 21:42, Andrew Tropin wrote:
> On 2024-09-04 18:42, Ludovic Courtès wrote:
>
>> Hi Jacopo,
>>
>> Jacopo Mondi <jacopo.mondi@ideasonboard.com> skribis:
>>
>>> Not exactly. In libcamera, apart from creating a library to ease all
>>> the camera stack plumbing, we're creating an ecosystem of open-source
>>> 3A algorithms (what we call the IPA modules).
>>>
>>> Camera vendors and ODMs which invested in products with specific
>>> camera features, consider 3A algorithms and their tuning their secret
>>> sauce and are usually not willing to consider releasing them as open
>>> source with, fortunately, notable exceptions such as RaspberryPi
>>>
>>> Please note that all the platforms libcamera supports have an
>>> open-source 3A algorithm module available part of the main code base,
>>> and we consider open source 3A modules our 'first class citizens' and
>>> we're willing to develop and maintain them in libcamera mainline
>>> branch as free software, but at this point we have to provide a way for
>>> third-parties to load binary modules if they want to.
>>>
>>> The alternative is to have them continue developing camera stacks
>>> fully behind closed doors as it has been done so far.
>>
>> OK, I see, thanks for explaining the context.
>>
>>> As said, modules not built against the libcamera sources will not be
>>> signed, as they are distributed by other means by a vendor in binary
>>> form. To establish if a module has been built with the libcamera
>>> sources or not, we sign it during the build with a volatile key and
>>> validate the signature at run-time, when the IPA module is loaded.
>>>
>>> IPA modules for which the signature is not valid (either because they
>>> are distributed as binaries or, as in this case, because the build
>>> system strips symbols before installing the objects) are loaded in an
>>> isolated process and instead of being operated with direct function
>>> calls, we have implemented an IPC mechanism to communicate with them.
>>> This path is way less tested by our regular users and in our daily
>>> work on libcamera. Vendors that are running their binaries as isolated
>>> might have fixed issues here and there but maybe they have not
>>> reported the issue and the associated fix upstream (we have no control
>>> over this).
>>>
>>> For this reason I don't suggest running modules as isolated, even more
>>> if you have no reasons to do so. If all it takes is re-signing IPA modules
>>> after stripping them as Andrew did I would really consider doing that.
>>
>> Yeah, got it. The other option, with the understanding that IPA modules
>> are all going to be free software here, would be to dismiss both the
>> authentication and the isolation mechanism, possibly with a custom
>> patch. It seems like the change wouldn’t be too intrusive and it would
>> solve the problem for “grafts” as well (grafts modify files in a
>> non-functional way).
>
> On 2024-09-02 10:45, Andrew Tropin via Bug reports for GNU Guix wrote:
>> Anyway, I think the current most reasonable solution is to remove
>> signing step at all, because the signaturs will be invalidated by
>> grafting anyway and make it work somehow (either by loading in
>> isolation if it's possible or by loading unsigned libraries without
>> signature check directly).
>
> Everything indicates that we need to disable module authentication.
>
> Jacopo, I think I'll patch IPAManager::isSignatureValid to always return
> true.
>
> https://git.libcamera.org/libcamera/libcamera.git/tree/src/libcamera/ipa_manager.cpp#n285
>
> Like that:
>
> From c99706475cde3d963a17f4f8871149711ce6c467 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Andrew Tropin <andrew@trop.in>
> Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2024 21:36:16 +0400
> Subject: [PATCH] libcamera: ipa_manager: Disable signature verification
>
> ---
> src/libcamera/ipa_manager.cpp | 28 +++++-----------------------
> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/src/libcamera/ipa_manager.cpp b/src/libcamera/ipa_manager.cpp
> index cfc24d38..4fd3cf3e 100644
> --- a/src/libcamera/ipa_manager.cpp
> +++ b/src/libcamera/ipa_manager.cpp
> @@ -284,33 +284,15 @@ IPAModule *IPAManager::module(PipelineHandler *pipe,
> uint32_t minVersion,
>
> bool IPAManager::isSignatureValid([[maybe_unused]] IPAModule *ipa) const
> {
> -#if HAVE_IPA_PUBKEY
> - char *force = utils::secure_getenv("LIBCAMERA_IPA_FORCE_ISOLATION");
> - if (force && force[0] != '\0') {
> - LOG(IPAManager, Debug)
> - << "Isolation of IPA module " << ipa->path()
> - << " forced through environment variable";
> - return false;
> - }
> -
> - File file{ ipa->path() };
> - if (!file.open(File::OpenModeFlag::ReadOnly))
> - return false;
> -
> - Span<uint8_t> data = file.map();
> - if (data.empty())
> - return false;
> -
> - bool valid = pubKey_.verify(data, ipa->signature());
> + LOG(IPAManager, Debug)
> + << "Signature verification is disabled by Guix. "
> + << "See https://issues.guix.gnu.org/72828 for more details.";
>
> LOG(IPAManager, Debug)
> << "IPA module " << ipa->path() << " signature is "
> - << (valid ? "valid" : "not valid");
> + << "not verified (verification skipped).";
>
> - return valid;
> -#else
> - return false;
> -#endif
> + return true;
> }
>
> } /* namespace libcamera */
> --
> 2.45.2
>
>
> Everyone is ok with it?
I've disabled signature verification, tested with cam -l and qcam, it
works good so far, will check browsers and pipewire after ci finish
building them.
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/guix.git/commit/?id=b0e224566f
Thank you everyone for participating, it helped a lot in narrowing down
and fixing the problem!
Marking issue as DONE.
I'll update corresponding ticket on libcamera bugtracker after I test
the rest of applications.
--
Best regards,
Andrew Tropin
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