A TOCTTOU (time-of-check to time-of-use) vulnerability has been found
in the activation code of user accounts, more specifically in the
code that copies the account skeletons.
* Vulnerability
The attack consists of the user being logged in after the account
skeletons have been copied to the home directory, but before the
owner of the account skeletons have been set. The user then deletes
a copied account skeleton (e.g. @file{$HOME/.gdbinit}) and replaces
it with a symbolic link to a file not owned by the user, such as
@file{/etc/shadow}.
The activation code then changes the ownership
of the file the symbolic link points to instead of the symbolic
link itself. At that point, the user has read-write access
to the target file.
* Where in the code does this happen?
Module: (gnu build activation).
Procedures: 'copy-account-skeletons' and 'activate-user-home'.
'copy-account-skeletons' creates the home directory, sets it
owner, copies the account skeletons, and chowns the copied skeletons,
in that order. The bug is that it dereferences symbolic links.
It is called from 'activate-user-home' if the home directory does
not already exist.
* Fix
The fix consist of initially creating the home directory root-owned and only
changing the owner of the home directory once all skeletons have been copied
and their owner has been set.
* Extra notes
A blog post, a news entry and a fix have been prepared and will be posted
and hopefully merged soon. The following tests succeeded:
$ make check-system TESTS='switch-to-system upgrade-services install-bootloader
basic'
$ make check
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