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Re: Documenting gpg-agent

From: Ken Manheimer
Subject: Re: Documenting gpg-agent
Date: Sat, 23 Dec 2006 13:11:17 -0500

On 12/23/06, David Kastrup <address@hidden> wrote:
"Ken Manheimer" <address@hidden> writes:

> my allout encryption provisions are badly disrupted with the new pgg
> revision, when gpg-agent is active.


> i'll look at having allout do transient inhibition of the new
> gpg-agent provisions (eg, let-binding pgg-gpg-use-agent to nil), but
> doubt i'll have time to look at the new pgg code to see about
> whether passed-in passphrases are disregarded.  so barring the
> former workaround, i doubt i'll have time to look at proper
> integration with the new pgg provisions before late january.

I'd like to see Emacs 22 out before we have to update all copyright
notices to 2007.  And I am afraid of a full month certain delay before
the release.  It is bad enough having to fight last-minute changes;
we'd argue ourselves to exhaustion about last-month changes.  "Why, we
still have a full month for testing" is what I expect to hear then.

So personally I'd really be glad if this could be resolved before your
hiatus, leaving one less excuse to further delay.  That does not mean
that other reasons for delay might not crop up, but at least there is
a _chance_ that we'll get this beast out the door at one point of

i've (just) posted a patch that inhibits pgg's use of gpg-agent within
the scope of a let body where allout does the encryption.  i hope it's
applied soon, so i can verify the update while i have some time.

the posted patch is a minimal workaround, though.  i suspect something
closer to a fix would be to have pgg not resort to pgg-agent when
passphrases are passed in to it - that might be considered a bug in
the current pgg implementation.  that would also give me a path to
incrementally integrating gpg-agent functionality to allout's
encryption - that may never make sense for symmetric keys, but may be
fairly easy to do (without sacrificing current allout encryption
conveniences) for key pair encryption.

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