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Re: 2023-02-27 Emacs news
From: |
Yuri Khan |
Subject: |
Re: 2023-02-27 Emacs news |
Date: |
Wed, 1 Mar 2023 01:56:36 +0700 |
On Wed, 1 Mar 2023 at 01:08, Dmitry Gutov <dgutov@yandex.ru> wrote:
>
> On 28/02/2023 16:05, Yuri Khan wrote:
> > If you open a malicious source file in an editor, you don’t expect it
> > to execute any code written within, surely not before you press the
> > Run key. If opening a file for editing trashes your home directory,
> > it’s a bug and a vulnerability. If opening a file for editing causes
> > personal information to be sent outside, it’s a bug and a
> > vulnerability.
>
> Neither of that happened with the linked "vulnerability", though.
>
> It only worked if you pressed "C-c C-f" on a line that contained
> something like
>
> require '; rm -rf ~'
(ruby-find-library-file &optional FEATURE-NAME)
Visit a library file denoted by FEATURE-NAME.
FEATURE-NAME is a relative file name, file extension is optional.
[…] When called
interactively, defaults to the feature name in the ‘require’
or ‘gem’ statement around point.
So it’s not an auto-pwn but rather user-assisted, as in, *if* the
attacker can convince you to visit a malicious source file *and* do a
navigation command on a dangerously-looking import, *then* you’re
pwned? That significantly reduces the severity in my book.