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Re: [GNU Crypto] PBE
From: |
Casey Marshall |
Subject: |
Re: [GNU Crypto] PBE |
Date: |
12 Mar 2003 17:39:00 -0800 |
On Wed, 2003-03-12 at 10:31, Raif S. Naffah wrote:
> Hash: RIPEMD160
>
> hello Casey,
>
> On Wednesday 12 March 2003 09:13, Casey Marshall wrote:
> > Raif S. Naffah wrote:
>
> ...but PBKDF2 can still be implemented as a prng type; right?
>
Sure; in fact it seems the best way to do it, outside of putting in an
entirely new interface.
> > A boolean flag, e.g. 'ALLOW_SHORT_KEYS' would allow those who know
> > what they're doing to use short keys, but still prevent short keys
> > from being used by default.
>
> i suggest the name of this boolean key to be: USE_WITH_PKCS5_V2 or
> something similar that explicitly mentions PKCS#5 v2. this is because
> the designers of pkcs#5 v2 are assumed to have analysed the
> consequences of allowing shorter keys and found them to be safe. of
> course, anybody using an hmac, even outside the context of pkcs#5 v2,
> can set this property to "true" but then, not only will they be doing
> this at their own risk, they will also be (in a way) mis-using the
> purpose of this feature.
>
Better, since I can't think of any other instances where a short HMAC
key would be used.
--
Casey Marshall || address@hidden
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