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[GNUnet-SVN] [gnurl] 109/116: ntlm: avoid integer overflow for malloc si


From: gnunet
Subject: [GNUnet-SVN] [gnurl] 109/116: ntlm: avoid integer overflow for malloc size
Date: Tue, 05 Dec 2017 14:52:19 +0100

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ng0 pushed a commit to branch master
in repository gnurl.

commit 7f2a1df6f5fc598750b2c6f34465c8d924db28cc
Author: Daniel Stenberg <address@hidden>
AuthorDate: Mon Nov 6 23:51:52 2017 +0100

    ntlm: avoid integer overflow for malloc size
    
    Reported-by: Alex Nichols
    Assisted-by: Kamil Dudka and Max Dymond
    
    CVE-2017-8816
    
    Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_2017-11e7.html
---
 lib/curl_ntlm_core.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/curl_ntlm_core.c b/lib/curl_ntlm_core.c
index 1309bf0d9..43a290574 100644
--- a/lib/curl_ntlm_core.c
+++ b/lib/curl_ntlm_core.c
@@ -646,6 +646,12 @@ CURLcode Curl_hmac_md5(const unsigned char *key, unsigned 
int keylen,
   return CURLE_OK;
 }
 
+#if defined(SIZEOF_SIZE_T) && (SIZEOF_SIZE_T > 4)
+#define SIZE_T_MAX 18446744073709551615U
+#else
+#define SIZE_T_MAX 4294967295U
+#endif
+
 /* This creates the NTLMv2 hash by using NTLM hash as the key and Unicode
  * (uppercase UserName + Domain) as the data
  */
@@ -655,10 +661,20 @@ CURLcode Curl_ntlm_core_mk_ntlmv2_hash(const char *user, 
size_t userlen,
                                        unsigned char *ntlmv2hash)
 {
   /* Unicode representation */
-  size_t identity_len = (userlen + domlen) * 2;
-  unsigned char *identity = malloc(identity_len);
+  size_t identity_len;
+  unsigned char *identity;
   CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
 
+  /* we do the length checks below separately to avoid integer overflow risk
+     on extreme data lengths */
+  if((userlen > SIZE_T_MAX/2) ||
+     (domlen > SIZE_T_MAX/2) ||
+     ((userlen + domlen) > SIZE_T_MAX/2))
+    return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+  identity_len = (userlen + domlen) * 2;
+  identity = malloc(identity_len);
+
   if(!identity)
     return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
 

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