[taler-docs] branch master updated (d908b8f -> 168cf44)

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    from d908b8f  mark up ‘kdf_id’
     new 563a699  add period at end of sentence
     new aa72dd1  mark up ‘kdf_id’
     new 168cf44  add ‘\ ’ post-markup to keep the ‘s’ separate

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Summary of changes:
 anastasis.rst | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/anastasis.rst b/anastasis.rst
index ecfda6b..9572dbb 100644
--- a/anastasis.rst
+++ b/anastasis.rst
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ which will be used to derive other keys later. The Hash 
must also include the
 respective **server_salt**. This also ensures that the **kdf_id** is different
 on each server. The use of Argon2 and the respective **server_salt** is 
intended
 to make it difficult to brute-force **kdf_id** values and help protect the 
user's
-privacy. Also this ensures that the **kdf_id**s on every server differs. 
However,
+privacy. Also this ensures that the **kdf_id**\ s on every server differs. 
However,
 we do not assume that the **identifier** or the **kdf_id** cannot be
 determined by an adversary performing a targeted attack, as a user's
 **identifier** is likely to always be known to state actors and may
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ likely also be available to other actors.
 
 **identifier**: The secret defined from the user beforehand.
 
-**server_salt**: The salt from the Server
+**server_salt**: The salt from the Server.
 
 **keysize**: The desired output size of the KDF, here 32 bytes.
 
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ Verification
 For users to authorize "policy" operations we need an EdDSA key pair.  As we
 cannot assure that the corresponding private key is truly secret, such policy
 operations must never be destructive: Should an adversary learn the private
-key, they could access (and with the kdf_id decrypt) the user's policy (but
+key, they could access (and with the **kdf_id** decrypt) the user's policy (but
 not the core secret), or upload a new version of the
 **encrypted recovery document** (but not delete an existing version).
 

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