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Re: safe renegotiation in client side

From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor
Subject: Re: safe renegotiation in client side
Date: Mon, 15 Mar 2010 19:20:06 -0400
User-agent: Mozilla-Thunderbird (X11/20091109)

On 03/15/2010 06:59 PM, Tomas Mraz wrote:
> On Mon, 2010-03-15 at 23:38 +0100, Simon Josefsson wrote: 
>> If that is the case, can't we make GnuTLS accept talking to "old"
>> servers by default, but if client certificate authentication is
>> requested by the application, it will tear down the connection if the
>> server doesn't support safe-renegotiation?
> Unfortunately the credentials might take even different forms such as
> the auth user name and password and they might be revealed to the
> attacker which was demonstrated in the Twitter attack.

I think Tomas is correct here; *any* re-negotiation can be used as a
vector for an attack like this, not just renegotiations which request
client certificates.


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