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02/02: gnu: Remove nss/fixed.
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From: |
guix-commits |
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Subject: |
02/02: gnu: Remove nss/fixed. |
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Date: |
Sat, 6 Jun 2020 15:32:10 -0400 (EDT) |
mbakke pushed a commit to branch staging
in repository guix.
commit 7cfa1f5e78a2e2a4f0b068e67b0362ac12993005
Author: Marius Bakke <marius@gnu.org>
AuthorDate: Sat Jun 6 21:28:07 2020 +0200
gnu: Remove nss/fixed.
The merge preceding this commit ignored the nss replacement added in commit
7bc396bf353c5550c49b3f8791b34072ba417d90. This commit removes the remaining
bits, because the fix is already present in nss@3.52.1.
* gnu/packages/patches/nss-CVE-2020-12399.patch: Delete file.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Adjust accordingly.
* gnu/packages/nss.scm (nss/fixed): Remove variable.
---
gnu/local.mk | 1 -
gnu/packages/nss.scm | 8 --
gnu/packages/patches/nss-CVE-2020-12399.patch | 138 --------------------------
3 files changed, 147 deletions(-)
diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk
index 120d68c..1685710 100644
--- a/gnu/local.mk
+++ b/gnu/local.mk
@@ -1295,7 +1295,6 @@ dist_patch_DATA =
\
%D%/packages/patches/ngircd-handle-zombies.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/network-manager-plugin-path.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/nsis-env-passthru.patch \
- %D%/packages/patches/nss-CVE-2020-12399.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/nss-increase-test-timeout.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/nss-pkgconfig.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/ntfs-3g-CVE-2019-9755.patch \
diff --git a/gnu/packages/nss.scm b/gnu/packages/nss.scm
index 9b9baf3..b19ad7e 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/nss.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/nss.scm
@@ -191,11 +191,3 @@ applications. Applications built with NSS can support SSL
v2 and v3, TLS,
PKCS #5, PKCS #7, PKCS #11, PKCS #12, S/MIME, X.509 v3 certificates, and other
security standards.")
(license license:mpl2.0)))
-
-(define nss/fixed
- (package
- (inherit nss)
- (source (origin
- (inherit (package-source nss))
- (patches (append (search-patches "nss-CVE-2020-12399.patch")
- (origin-patches (package-source nss))))))))
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/nss-CVE-2020-12399.patch
b/gnu/packages/patches/nss-CVE-2020-12399.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 0d91b65..0000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/nss-CVE-2020-12399.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2020-12399 (Timing attack on DSA signature generation: NSS has
-shown timing differences when performing DSA signatures, which was
-exploitable and could eventually leak private keys.)
-
-Copied from upstream:
-<https://hg.mozilla.org/projects/nss/rev/daa823a4a29bcef0fec33a379ec83857429aea2e>
-but with "nss/" inserted into the file name to patch.
-
-# HG changeset patch
-# User Robert Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com>
-# Date 1589907685 0
-# Node ID daa823a4a29bcef0fec33a379ec83857429aea2e
-# Parent d2cfb4ccdf167e5ea06d2bb5bc39c50f789929c8
-Bug 1631576 - Force a fixed length for DSA exponentiation r=pereida,bbrumley
-
-Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D72011
-
-diff --git a/nss/lib/freebl/dsa.c b/nss/lib/freebl/dsa.c
---- a/nss/lib/freebl/dsa.c
-+++ b/nss/lib/freebl/dsa.c
-@@ -308,23 +308,24 @@ DSA_NewKeyFromSeed(const PQGParams *para
- SECItem seedItem;
- seedItem.data = (unsigned char *)seed;
- seedItem.len = PQG_GetLength(¶ms->subPrime);
- return dsa_NewKeyExtended(params, &seedItem, privKey);
- }
-
- static SECStatus
- dsa_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECItem *signature, const SECItem *digest,
-- const unsigned char *kb)
-+ const unsigned char *kbytes)
- {
- mp_int p, q, g; /* PQG parameters */
- mp_int x, k; /* private key & pseudo-random integer */
- mp_int r, s; /* tuple (r, s) is signature) */
- mp_int t; /* holding tmp values */
- mp_int ar; /* holding blinding values */
-+ mp_digit fuzz; /* blinding multiplier for q */
- mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
- SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
- unsigned int dsa_subprime_len, dsa_signature_len, offset;
- SECItem localDigest;
- unsigned char localDigestData[DSA_MAX_SUBPRIME_LEN];
- SECItem t2 = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
-
- /* FIPS-compliance dictates that digest is a SHA hash. */
-@@ -368,31 +369,46 @@ dsa_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECIt
- CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&q));
- CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&g));
- CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&x));
- CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&k));
- CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&r));
- CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&s));
- CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&t));
- CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&ar));
-+
- /*
- ** Convert stored PQG and private key into MPI integers.
- */
- SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->params.prime, &p);
- SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->params.subPrime, &q);
- SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->params.base, &g);
- SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->privateValue, &x);
-- OCTETS_TO_MPINT(kb, &k, dsa_subprime_len);
-+ OCTETS_TO_MPINT(kbytes, &k, dsa_subprime_len);
-+
-+ /* k blinding create a single value that has the high bit set in
-+ * the mp_digit*/
-+ if (RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(&fuzz, sizeof(mp_digit)) != SECSuccess)
{
-+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
-+ rv = SECFailure;
-+ goto cleanup;
-+ }
-+ fuzz |= 1ULL << ((sizeof(mp_digit) * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE - 1));
- /*
- ** FIPS 186-1, Section 5, Step 1
- **
- ** r = (g**k mod p) mod q
- */
-- CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(&g, &k, &p, &r)); /* r = g**k mod p */
-- CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(&r, &q, &r)); /* r = r mod q */
-+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mul_d(&q, fuzz, &t)); /* t = q*fuzz */
-+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_add(&k, &t, &t)); /* t = k+q*fuzz */
-+ /* length of t is now fixed, bits in k have been blinded */
-+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(&g, &t, &p, &r)); /* r = g**t mod p */
-+ /* r is now g**(k+q*fuzz) == g**k mod p */
-+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(&r, &q, &r)); /* r = r mod q */
-+
- /*
- ** FIPS 186-1, Section 5, Step 2
- **
- ** s = (k**-1 * (HASH(M) + x*r)) mod q
- */
- if (DSA_NewRandom(NULL, &key->params.subPrime, &t2) != SECSuccess) {
- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
- rv = SECFailure;
-@@ -406,25 +422,34 @@ dsa_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECIt
- goto cleanup;
- }
- SECITEM_TO_MPINT(t2, &ar); /* ar <-$ Zq */
- SECITEM_FreeItem(&t2, PR_FALSE);
-
- /* Using mp_invmod on k directly would leak bits from k. */
- CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mul(&k, &ar, &k)); /* k = k * ar */
- CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&k, &t, &q, &k)); /* k = k * t mod q */
-- CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_invmod(&k, &q, &k)); /* k = k**-1 mod q */
-+ /* k is now k*t*ar */
-+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_invmod(&k, &q, &k)); /* k = k**-1 mod q */
-+ /* k is now (k*t*ar)**-1 */
- CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&k, &t, &q, &k)); /* k = k * t mod q */
-- SECITEM_TO_MPINT(localDigest, &s); /* s = HASH(M) */
-+ /* k is now (k*ar)**-1 */
-+ SECITEM_TO_MPINT(localDigest, &s); /* s = HASH(M) */
- /* To avoid leaking secret bits here the addition is blinded. */
-- CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mul(&x, &ar, &x)); /* x = x * ar */
-- CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&x, &r, &q, &x)); /* x = x * r mod q */
-+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mul(&x, &ar, &x)); /* x = x * ar */
-+ /* x is now x*ar */
-+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&x, &r, &q, &x)); /* x = x * r mod q */
-+ /* x is now x*r*ar */
- CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&s, &ar, &q, &t)); /* t = s * ar mod q */
-- CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_add(&t, &x, &s)); /* s = t + x */
-- CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&s, &k, &q, &s)); /* s = s * k mod q */
-+ /* t is now hash(M)*ar */
-+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_add(&t, &x, &s)); /* s = t + x */
-+ /* s is now (HASH(M)+x*r)*ar */
-+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&s, &k, &q, &s)); /* s = s * k mod q */
-+ /* s is now (HASH(M)+x*r)*ar*(k*ar)**-1 = (k**-1)*(HASH(M)+x*r) */
-+
- /*
- ** verify r != 0 and s != 0
- ** mentioned as optional in FIPS 186-1.
- */
- if (mp_cmp_z(&r) == 0 || mp_cmp_z(&s) == 0) {
- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
- rv = SECFailure;
- goto cleanup;
-