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Re: Hardening (was: Re: tor: update to

From: Ricardo Wurmus
Subject: Re: Hardening (was: Re: tor: update to
Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2017 10:09:36 +0100
User-agent: mu4e 0.9.18; emacs 25.1.1

Leo Famulari <address@hidden> writes:

> On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 08:56:48PM +0000, ng0 wrote:
>> Leo Famulari <address@hidden> writes:
>> > Should we build Tor with "--enable-expensive-hardening"?
>> I will take a look later what can be applied other than the
>> default configure flags.
>> I'm all for hardening, but it seems that the first basic ideas
>> for Guix are stuck in the idea state.
> As far as I can tell, --enable-expensive-hardening is specific to Tor,
> so it's not relevant to the project of hardening all Guix packages.
>> It would be great to see some movement on this during this
>> year. I volunteer to help with it, though I don't have as much
>> experience with SELinux (and only basic experience with
>> GrSecurity without a modular kernel like GuixSD uses).
> Yes, this effort needs a champion.

I know SELinux and I have a couple of almost-ready packages for it.  The
bigger problem for us is writing SELinux policies, because we cannot
just use those from Fedora.

SELinux policies are applied to file paths (which are not stable in
Guix) and are “remembered” using extended file attributes.  This means
we’d have to write policies that can deal with arbitrary prefixes and
we’d have to add an optional service to automatically label all store
items (that’s expensive but maybe it can be done incrementally).

However, this is completely separate from enabling a configure flag for


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