[Gzz-commits] manuscripts/Sigs article.rst

[Tuomas J. Lukka]

CVSROOT:        /cvsroot/gzz
Module name:    manuscripts
Changes by:     Tuomas J. Lukka <address@hidden>        03/05/17 14:27:30

Modified files:
        Sigs           : article.rst 

Log message:
        org

CVSWeb URLs:
http://savannah.gnu.org/cgi-bin/viewcvs/gzz/manuscripts/Sigs/article.rst.diff?tr1=1.43&tr2=1.44&r1=text&r2=text

Patches:
Index: manuscripts/Sigs/article.rst
diff -u manuscripts/Sigs/article.rst:1.43 manuscripts/Sigs/article.rst:1.44
--- manuscripts/Sigs/article.rst:1.43   Sat May 17 14:26:00 2003
+++ manuscripts/Sigs/article.rst        Sat May 17 14:27:30 2003
@@ -290,14 +290,25 @@
   This means that `$N \\log k \\ge h$`
 
     - this is a nice theoretical result: it *is* possible to sign anything
-      without trapdoors
+      without trapdoors - full feature set of normal (non-one-time) DSs
 
     - realistic? How much does this need?
 
-      - Works with `$k=10$`, `$N=16$` for SHA-1.
+      - Works with `$k=10$`, `$N=16$` for SHA-1. SIG LENGTH?
 
-Random or pseudo-random, but probabilistic
-------------------------------------------
+Ordered
+-------
+
+- Keep count of number of signatures made
+
+- use bits of count for choosing
+
+- mustn't lose count! 
+
+- can't copy key!
+
+Probabilistic limited
+---------------------
 
 Shorter signatures
 
@@ -317,15 +328,6 @@
 
     - birthday paradox again: must not allow the attacker to have
       2**30 messages being signed
-
-Ordered
--------
-
-- Keep count of number of signatures made
-
-- use bits of count for choosing
-
-- mustn't lose count! 
 
 Applicability to Digital Publishing
 ===================================