[Gzz-commits] manuscripts/Sigs article.rst

[Tuomas J. Lukka]

CVSROOT:        /cvsroot/gzz
Module name:    manuscripts
Changes by:     Tuomas J. Lukka <address@hidden>        03/05/17 15:54:16

Modified files:
        Sigs           : article.rst 

Log message:
        abs

CVSWeb URLs:
http://savannah.gnu.org/cgi-bin/viewcvs/gzz/manuscripts/Sigs/article.rst.diff?tr1=1.62&tr2=1.63&r1=text&r2=text

Patches:
Index: manuscripts/Sigs/article.rst
diff -u manuscripts/Sigs/article.rst:1.62 manuscripts/Sigs/article.rst:1.63
--- manuscripts/Sigs/article.rst:1.62   Sat May 17 15:42:35 2003
+++ manuscripts/Sigs/article.rst        Sat May 17 15:54:16 2003
@@ -2,41 +2,42 @@
 One-time Signature Key Boosting
 ===============================
 
-Abstract
-========
+..  raw:: latex
 
-We propose an unlimited-time digital signature scheme based
-on a one-time signature scheme and a random oracle.
-The random oracle is used to map a private key deterministically
-to a 
-set of new private keys. 
-The original private key is used (through a hash tree)
-to sign the new 
-private keys.
-For each message, one of the new keys is chosen,
-and this process is iterated for a number
-of times to obtain the final private key used to sign
-the actual message. The signature consists of
-the chain of signatures from the original public key
-to the final signature.
+    \begin{abstract}
+    We propose an unlimited-time digital signature scheme based
+    on a one-time signature scheme and a random oracle.
+    The random oracle is used to map a private key deterministically
+    to a 
+    set of new private keys. 
+    The original private key is used (through a hash tree)
+    to sign the new 
+    private keys.
+    For each message, one of the new keys is chosen,
+    and this process is iterated for a number
+    of times to obtain the final private key used to sign
+    the actual message. The signature consists of
+    the chain of signatures from the original public key
+    to the final signature.
+
+    On a theoretical level, our scheme allows the construction
+    of a feasible algorithm with the full digital signature feature
+    set without using a trapdoor function, i.e. without
+    relying on
+    number-theoretic assumptions such as the hardness
+    of factoring or discrete logs.
+
+    As long as the random oracle, used to generate the new private keys
+    and to implement the one-time signatures, 
+    isn't broken, an exhaustive
+    key search is the only way to break the scheme.
+    \end{abstract}
 
 ..  The detailed characteristics of the algorithm are determined
     by the one-time signature scheme used,
     the number of iterations,
     and the algorithm for choosing which private key to use.
 
-On a theoretical level, our scheme allows the construction
-of a feasible algorithm with the full digital signature feature
-set without using a trapdoor function, i.e. without
-relying on
-number-theoretic assumptions such as the hardness
-of factoring or discrete logs.
-
-As long as the random oracle, used to generate the new private keys
-and to implement the one-time signatures, 
-isn't broken, an exhaustive
-key search is the only way to break the scheme.
-
 ..  Additionally, rejecting invalid signatures can be 
     significantly faster than in RSA-like systems.
     On the other hand, signing is comparatively slow
@@ -292,6 +293,8 @@
 
         Formally, this is:
         Key boosting(16, Merkle hash tree(10, Merkle-Winternitz(160,160,2), 
10))
+
+       and has the octuplet??
 
 Ordered
 -------