[Gzz-commits] manuscripts/Sigs article.rst

[Tuomas J. Lukka]

CVSROOT:        /cvsroot/gzz
Module name:    manuscripts
Changes by:     Tuomas J. Lukka <address@hidden>        03/05/20 05:30:56

Modified files:
        Sigs           : article.rst 

Log message:
        jvkcomm

CVSWeb URLs:
http://savannah.gnu.org/cgi-bin/viewcvs/gzz/manuscripts/Sigs/article.rst.diff?tr1=1.157&tr2=1.158&r1=text&r2=text

Patches:
Index: manuscripts/Sigs/article.rst
diff -u manuscripts/Sigs/article.rst:1.157 manuscripts/Sigs/article.rst:1.158
--- manuscripts/Sigs/article.rst:1.157  Mon May 19 20:18:02 2003
+++ manuscripts/Sigs/article.rst        Tue May 20 05:30:56 2003
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@
 Other choices such as BiBa [perrig01biba]_
 are possible, but not evaluated in this article.
 
-The private key for this scheme is a random number
+The private key for the key boosted scheme is a random number
 from which a private key for the underlying 
 one-time-signature primitive can be generated
 using the random oracle.
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@
 is not based on complexity of inverting trapdoor functions;
 it requires only a hash function in the random oracle model.
 
-To our knowledge, this is has not previously been possible without
+To our knowledge, this has not previously been possible without
 remembering things about
 previously signed documents and changing to a new
 private key after a given number of signatures.
@@ -222,7 +222,8 @@
 
 If we use Merkle hash trees to obtain the underlying `$q$`-time scheme
 from a one-time scheme, we have for the parameters of the two algorithms
-the inequality `$ nN \\ge 160 $`.
+the inequality `$ nN \\ge 160 $`, where `$n$` is the depth of
+the Merkle hash tree.
 
 Obtaining the minimal integral solutions of this inequality 
 gives us a tradeoff where the length of the signature is approximately
@@ -431,12 +432,12 @@
 hash functions may be found. Also, while
 all digital
 signatures in practice do depend on a hash function for
-long messages, our demands for are stricter: the hash
+long messages, our demands for it are stricter: the hash
 function must also be a random oracle.
 
-We believe that as long as the random oracle, 
+We believe that as long as the random oracle
 used to generate the new private keys
-and to implement the one-time signatures, 
+and to implement the one-time signatures
 isn't broken, an exhaustive
 key search is the only way to break the scheme.
 At the very least, this scheme is