Potential use case for opaque space bank: domain factored network stack

[Pierre THIERRY]

I just read the "Network Subsystems Reloaded" paper by Sinha, Sarat and
Shapiro. Part of it discusses a network stack implemented for EROS with
several isolated processes. As such layout typically lacks performance,
they at least avoid copying accross protection boundaries with shared
memory.

A client of the TCP stack would give it access to four memory regions:
two for TCP headers and two for payloads, for transmission and
reception. This avoids DOS attacks by clients because the stack doesn't
use it's own limited memory to work on behalf of it's clients.

But to ensure correctness of network packets, header sections must not
be writable by the client.

With the design of space banks as it was vigourously debated earlier,
would that be even possible? IIRC, it was not considered desirable that
a process A could give authority to some of it's resources (here,
memory) to another process B while losing some of it's own authority to
it (but having the ability to reclaim it back).

Curiously,
Nowhere man
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