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Re: [Qemu-arm] [Qemu-devel] [PATCH V10 7/9] hw/misc/pvpanic: preparing f
Re: [Qemu-arm] [Qemu-devel] [PATCH V10 7/9] hw/misc/pvpanic: preparing foradding configure interface
Sat, 1 Dec 2018 12:05:02 +0000
On Sat, 1 Dec 2018 at 09:28, <address@hidden> wrote:
> Peter Maydell wrote:
> >This kind of thing is why a PCI device is cleaner -- it just
> >works on any machine with a PCI controller, it by default is
> >something that the user can provide if they want to and not if
> >they don't, and it's not a custom UI that management layers
> >might need to special-case. The guest does need to do a bit
> >of PCI probing and setup initially, but then it can just leave
> >the MMIO BAR permanently mapped and write to that address
> >when the guest panics.
> Usually, it doesn't matter if there is this pvpanic device or not, so I
> haven't considered configurability from the beginning.
It matters to people who don't want it, because it increases
the attack surface presented to the guest.
> I didn't expect you to strongly recommend the use of PCI devices.
> Doing so is not just going to roll back some of the code in the kernel...
> I'll think about your suggestions.
My view on this hasn't changed since October:
if this really really needs to be an MMIO device then it can
be done, but a PCI device is a much cleaner interface which
is more widely usable than just the virt board.