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Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] Security house-cleaning
From: |
Renzo Davoli |
Subject: |
Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] Security house-cleaning |
Date: |
Thu, 17 Jun 2004 21:59:44 +0200 |
User-agent: |
Mutt/1.3.28i |
> Other future considerations:
> - PCI Proxy support (if it is ever offically supported)
> How will the host OS allow access by QEMU guest in this case?
> - Other bus (USB, firewire, etc) direct access to real hardware
The "safe" mode to do that is to define some kind of daemon running
as root managing tha physical card or port access and qemu joins the
daemon to have the services.
The daemon can have config files for the sysadm to define each user
privileges while the virtual machine itself runs with user permissions.
The obvious problem in doing that is performance.
renzo
- [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] Security house-cleaning, Tim, 2004/06/17
- Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] Security house-cleaning, Gianni Tedesco, 2004/06/17
- Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] Security house-cleaning, Renzo Davoli, 2004/06/17
- Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] Security house-cleaning, Panagiotis Issaris, 2004/06/17
- Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] Security house-cleaning, Sebastien Bechet, 2004/06/17
- Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] Security house-cleaning, Tim, 2004/06/17
- Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] Security house-cleaning, Sander Nagtegaal, 2004/06/17
- Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] Security house-cleaning, Gianni Tedesco, 2004/06/17
- Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] Security house-cleaning,
Renzo Davoli <=
- Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] Security house-cleaning, Tim, 2004/06/17