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Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC] [PATCH 0/2] Sandboxing Qemu guests with Libseccom

From: Daniel P. Berrange
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC] [PATCH 0/2] Sandboxing Qemu guests with Libseccomp
Date: Tue, 8 May 2012 10:15:35 +0100
User-agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15)

On Fri, May 04, 2012 at 04:08:36PM -0300, Eduardo Otubo wrote:
> Hello all,
> This is the first effort to sandboxing Qemu guests using Libseccomp[0]. The
> patches that follows are pretty simple and straightforward. I added the 
> correct
> options and checks to the configure script and the basic calls to libseccomp 
> in
> the main loop at vl.c. Details of each one are in the emails of the patch set.
> This support limits the system call footprint of the entire QEMU process to a
> limited set of syscalls, those that we know QEMU uses.  The idea is to limit
> the allowable syscalls, therefore limiting the impact that an attacked guest
> could have on the host system.

What functionality has been lost by applying this seccomp filter ? I've not
looked closely at the code, but it appears as if this blocks pretty much
any kind of runtime device changes. ie no hotplug of any kind will work ?

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