On Tuesday, June 05, 2012 11:51:40 PM Alexander Graf wrote:
On 05.06.2012, at 23:45, Paul Moore wrote:
On Tuesday, June 05, 2012 03:08:26 AM Alexander Graf wrote:
Which gets me to a new idea. Why not exit(1) when we detect FIPS and a
password is set? I agree with the assessment that we should never
silently drop features. So the best way to make sure that the user knows
he did something stupid (enable FIPS, but require a non-FIPS compliant
authentication method) would be to just quit, no?
That is basically what the patch does now. In vnc_display_open() if it
detects that the user has supplied a VNC password it prints an error to
stderr and returns an error which causes QEMU to exit.
The error message displayed is shown below:
"VNC password auth disabled due to FIPS mode, consider using the VeNCrypt
or SASL authentication methods as an alernative"
... which seems pretty obvious to me. If anyone would prefer something
different, let me know.
No, as long as the spelling is actually correct and not the one above,
that's perfectly fine.
What, not a fan of my "alernative" spelling? Fixed in the next version of the
I just have a habit of not reading the patches I comment on :).
If nothing else, it makes the discussions much more interesting :)
On Tuesday, June 05, 2012 09:23:04 AM Anthony Liguori wrote:
I think my primary requirement is: allow a user to use vnc authentication
even when fips mode is active by using some command line option.
I'll agree that FIPS mode can be a bit silly in the case of QEMU and VNC
but to be honest, that requirement above seems just as silly to me, if
not more so. However, if making this behavior optional is what it takes
to get the patch accepted, so be it.
I'll start working on v4 of the patch tomorrow.
Let's just wait for Anthony to reply ...
Fine with me, I've got plenty else to do in the meantime and I don't think
this is 1.1 material anyway.