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Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 8/8] spapr_pci: Use XICS interrupt allocator

From: Alexander Graf
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 8/8] spapr_pci: Use XICS interrupt allocator and do not cache interrupts in PHB
Date: Wed, 21 May 2014 11:50:09 +0200
User-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.9; rv:24.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/24.5.0

On 21.05.14 11:33, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
On 05/21/2014 07:13 PM, Alexander Graf wrote:
On 21.05.14 11:11, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
On Wed, May 21, 2014 at 11:06:09AM +0200, Alexander Graf wrote:
On 21.05.14 10:52, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
On 05/21/2014 06:40 PM, Alexander Graf wrote:
On 15.05.14 11:59, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
Currently SPAPR PHB keeps track of all allocated MSI/MISX interrupt as
XICS used to be unable to reuse interrupts which becomes a problem for
dynamic MSI reconfiguration which is happening on guest driver reload or
PCI hot (un)plug. Another problem is that PHB has a limit of devices
supporting MSI/MSIX (SPAPR_MSIX_MAX_DEVS=32) and there is no good reason
for that.

This makes use of new XICS ability to reuse interrupts.

This removes cached MSI configuration from SPAPR PHB so the first IRQ
of a device is stored in MSI/MSIX config space so there is no need to
this anywhere else. From now on, SPAPR PHB only keeps flags telling what
of interrupt for which device it has configured in order to return
error if
(for example) MSIX was enabled and the guest is trying to disable MSI
it has not enabled.

This removes a limit for the maximum number of MSIX-enabled devices
per PHB,
now XICS and PCI bus capacity are the only limitation.

This changes migration stream as it fixes vmstate_spapr_pci_msi::name
which was
wrong since the beginning.

This fixed traces to be more informative.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <address@hidden>

In reality either MSIX or MSI is enabled, never both. So I could remove
bitmaps from this patch, would it make sense?
Is this a hard requirement? Does a device have to choose between MSIX and
MSI or could it theoretically have both enabled? Is this a PCI
a PAPR/XICS limitation or just a limitation of your implementation?
My implementation does not have this limitation, I asked if I can simplify
code by introducing one :)

I cannot see any reason why PCI cannot have both MSI and MSIX enabled but
it does not seem to be used by anyone => cannot debug and confirm.

PAPR spec assumes that if the guest tries enabling MSIX when MSI is
enabled, this is a "change", not enabling both types. But it also says MSI
and MSIX vector numbers are not shared. Hm.
Yeah, I'm not aware of any limitation on hardware here and I'd
rather not impose one.

Michael, do you know of any hardware that uses MSI *and* MSI-X at
the same time?

No, and the PCI spec says:
     A function is permitted to implement both MSI and MSI-X, but system
     software is
     prohibited from enabling both at the same time. If system software
     enables both at the same time, the result is undefined.
Ah, cool. So yes Alexey, feel free to impose it :).
Heh. This solves just half of the problem - I still have to keep track of
what device got MSI/MSIX configured via that ibm,change-msi interface. I
was hoping I can store such flag somewhere in a device PCI config space but
MSI/MSIX enable bit is not good as it is not set when those calls are made.
And I cannot rely on address/data fields much as the guest can change them
(I already use them to store IRQ numbers and btw it is missing checks when
I read them back for disposal, I'll fix in next round).

Or on "enable" event I could put IRQ numbers to .data of MSI config space
and on "disable" check if it is not zero, then configuration took place,
then I can remove my msi[]/msix[] flag arrays. If the guest did any change
to MSI/MSIX config space (it does not on SPAPR except weird selftest
cases), I compare .data with what ICS can possibly have and either reject
"disable" or handle it and if it breaks XICS - that's too bad for the
stupid guest. Would that be acceptable?

Can't you prohibit the guest from writing to the MSI configuration registers itself? Then you don't need to do sanity checks.


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