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Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH for-2.6] nbd: Don't kill server on client that d


From: Max Reitz
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH for-2.6] nbd: Don't kill server on client that doesn't request TLS
Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2016 23:08:12 +0200
User-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/38.7.2

On 07.04.2016 22:29, Eric Blake wrote:
> Upstream NBD is documenting that servers MAY choose to operate
> in a conditional mode, where it is up to the client whether to
> use TLS.  For qemu's case, we want to always be in FORCEDTLS
> mode, because of the risk of man-in-the-middle attacks, and since
> we never export more than one device; likewise, the qemu client
> will ALWAYS send NBD_OPT_STARTTLS as its first option.  But now
> that SELECTIVETLS servers exist, it is feasible to encounter a
> (non-qemu) client that does not do NBD_OPT_STARTTLS first, but
> rather wants to take advantage of the conditional modes it might
> find elsewhere.
> 
> Since we require TLS, we are within our rights to drop connections
> on any client that doesn't negotiate it right away, or which
> attempts to negotiate it incorrectly, without violating the intent
> of the NBD Protocol.  However, it's better to allow the client to
> continue trying, on the grounds that maybe the client will get the
> hint to send NBD_OPT_STARTTLS.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <address@hidden>
> ---
> 
> My earlier patch was arguably incomplete:
> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-04/msg01265.html
> 
> But as it is already in a pull request, and as this one is
> a bit more controversial, it's best to keep it as a separate patch.
> 
>  nbd/server.c | 10 ++++++++--
>  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/nbd/server.c b/nbd/server.c
> index 7843584..2b727f0 100644
> --- a/nbd/server.c
> +++ b/nbd/server.c
> @@ -450,9 +450,12 @@ static int nbd_negotiate_options(NBDClient *client)
> 
>              default:
>                  TRACE("Option 0x%x not permitted before TLS", clientflags);
> +                if (nbd_negotiate_drop_sync(client->ioc, length) != length) {
> +                    return -EIO;
> +                }
>                  nbd_negotiate_send_rep(client->ioc, NBD_REP_ERR_TLS_REQD,
>                                         clientflags);
> -                return -EINVAL;
> +                break;
>              }

What about NBD_OPT_EXPORTNAME? The specification says that this option
does not allow for errors, and so the session must be terminated if this
option is sent in FORCEDTLS mode without TLS having been negotiated.

Max

>          } else if (fixedNewstyle) {
>              switch (clientflags) {
> @@ -470,6 +473,9 @@ static int nbd_negotiate_options(NBDClient *client)
>                  return nbd_negotiate_handle_export_name(client, length);
> 
>              case NBD_OPT_STARTTLS:
> +                if (nbd_negotiate_drop_sync(client->ioc, length) != length) {
> +                    return -EIO;
> +                }
>                  if (client->tlscreds) {
>                      TRACE("TLS already enabled");
>                      nbd_negotiate_send_rep(client->ioc, NBD_REP_ERR_INVALID,
> @@ -479,7 +485,7 @@ static int nbd_negotiate_options(NBDClient *client)
>                      nbd_negotiate_send_rep(client->ioc, NBD_REP_ERR_POLICY,
>                                             clientflags);
>                  }
> -                return -EINVAL;
> +                break;
>              default:
>                  TRACE("Unsupported option 0x%x", clientflags);
>                  if (nbd_negotiate_drop_sync(client->ioc, length) != length) {
> 


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