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Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v7 RFC] block/vxhs: Initial commit to add Verita
From: |
Daniel P. Berrange |
Subject: |
Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v7 RFC] block/vxhs: Initial commit to add Veritas HyperScale VxHS block device support |
Date: |
Fri, 18 Nov 2016 08:57:50 +0000 |
User-agent: |
Mutt/1.7.1 (2016-10-04) |
On Fri, Nov 18, 2016 at 02:26:21AM -0500, Jeff Cody wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 16, 2016 at 08:12:41AM +0000, Stefan Hajnoczi wrote:
> > On Tue, Nov 15, 2016 at 10:38 PM, ashish mittal <address@hidden> wrote:
> > > On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 2:45 PM, Stefan Hajnoczi <address@hidden> wrote:
> > >> On Tue, Sep 27, 2016 at 09:09:49PM -0700, Ashish Mittal wrote:
> > >> 5.
> > >> I don't see any endianness handling or portable alignment of struct
> > >> fields in the network protocol code. Binary network protocols need to
> > >> take care of these issue for portability. This means libqnio compiled
> > >> for different architectures will not work. Do you plan to support any
> > >> other architectures besides x86?
> > >>
> > >
> > > No, we support only x86 and do not plan to support any other arch.
> > > Please let me know if this necessitates any changes to the configure
> > > script.
> >
> > I think no change to ./configure is necessary. The library will only
> > ship on x86 so other platforms will never attempt to compile the code.
> >
> > >> 6.
> > >> The networking code doesn't look robust: kvset uses assert() on input
> > >> from the network so the other side of the connection could cause SIGABRT
> > >> (coredump), the client uses the msg pointer as the cookie for the
> > >> response packet so the server can easily crash the client by sending a
> > >> bogus cookie value, etc. Even on the client side these things are
> > >> troublesome but on a server they are guaranteed security issues. I
> > >> didn't look into it deeply. Please audit the code.
> > >>
> > >
> > > By design, our solution on OpenStack platform uses a closed set of
> > > nodes communicating on dedicated networks. VxHS servers on all the
> > > nodes are on a dedicated network. Clients (qemu) connects to these
> > > only after reading the server IP from the XML (read by libvirt). The
> > > XML cannot be modified without proper access. Therefore, IMO this
> > > problem would be relevant only if someone were to use qnio as a
> > > generic mode of communication/data transfer, but for our use-case, we
> > > will not run into this problem. Is this explanation acceptable?
> >
> > No. The trust model is that the guest is untrusted and in the worst
> > case may gain code execution in QEMU due to security bugs.
> >
> > You are assuming block/vxhs.c and libqnio are trusted but that
> > assumption violates the trust model.
> >
> > In other words:
> > 1. Guest exploits a security hole inside QEMU and gains code execution
> > on the host.
> > 2. Guest uses VxHS client file descriptor on host to send a malicious
> > packet to VxHS server.
> > 3. VxHS server is compromised by guest.
> > 4. Compromised VxHS server sends malicious packets to all other
> > connected clients.
> > 5. All clients have been compromised.
> >
> > This means both the VxHS client and server must be robust. They have
> > to validate inputs to avoid buffer overflows, assertion failures,
> > infinite loops, etc.
> >
> > Stefan
>
>
> The libqnio code is important with respect to the VxHS driver. It is a bit
> different than other existing external protocol drivers, in that the current
> user and developer base is small, and the code itself is pretty new. So I
> think for the VxHS driver here upstream, we really do need to get some of
> the libqnio issues squared away. I don't know if we've ever explicitly
> address the extent to which libqnio issues affect the driver
> merging, so I figure it is probably worth discussing here.
>
> To try and consolidate libqnio discussion, here is what I think I've read /
> seen from others as the major issues that should be addressed in libqnio:
>
> * Code auditing, static analysis, and general code cleanup. Things like
> memory leaks shouldn't be happening, and some prior libqnio compiler
> warnings imply that there is more code analysis that should be done with
> libqnio.
>
> (With regards to memory leaks: Valgrind may be useful to track these down:
>
> # valgrind ./qemu-io -c 'write -pP 0xae 66000 128k' \
> vxhs://localhost/test.raw
>
> ==30369== LEAK SUMMARY:
> ==30369== definitely lost: 4,168 bytes in 2 blocks
> ==30369== indirectly lost: 1,207,720 bytes in 58,085 blocks)
>
> * Potential security issues such as buffer overruns, input validation, etc.,
> need to be audited.
>
> * Async operations need to be truly asynchronous, without blocking calls.
>
> * Daniel pointed out that there is no authentication method for taking to a
> remote server. This seems a bit scary. Maybe all that is needed here is
> some clarification of the security scheme for authentication? My
> impression from above is that you are relying on the networks being
> private to provide some sort of implicit authentication, though, and this
> seems fragile (and doesn't protect against a compromised guest or other
> process on the server, for one).
While relying on some kind of private network may have been acceptable
10 years ago, I don't think it is a credible authentication / security
strategy in the current (increasingly) hostile network environments. You
really have to assume as a starting position that even internal networks
are compromised these days.
Regards,
Daniel
--
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- Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v7 RFC] block/vxhs: Initial commit to add Veritas HyperScale VxHS block device support, (continued)
Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v7 RFC] block/vxhs: Initial commit to add Veritas HyperScale VxHS block device support, Stefan Hajnoczi, 2016/11/14
Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v7 RFC] block/vxhs: Initial commit to add Veritas HyperScale VxHS block device support, ashish mittal, 2016/11/15
- Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v7 RFC] block/vxhs: Initial commit to add Veritas HyperScale VxHS block device support, Stefan Hajnoczi, 2016/11/16
- Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v7 RFC] block/vxhs: Initial commit to add Veritas HyperScale VxHS block device support, Ketan Nilangekar, 2016/11/18
- Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v7 RFC] block/vxhs: Initial commit to add Veritas HyperScale VxHS block device support, Daniel P. Berrange, 2016/11/18
- Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v7 RFC] block/vxhs: Initial commit to add Veritas HyperScale VxHS block device support, Ketan Nilangekar, 2016/11/18
- Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v7 RFC] block/vxhs: Initial commit to add Veritas HyperScale VxHS block device support, Daniel P. Berrange, 2016/11/18
- Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v7 RFC] block/vxhs: Initial commit to add Veritas HyperScale VxHS block device support, Ketan Nilangekar, 2016/11/23
- Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v7 RFC] block/vxhs: Initial commit to add Veritas HyperScale VxHS block device support, ashish mittal, 2016/11/23
- Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v7 RFC] block/vxhs: Initial commit to add Veritas HyperScale VxHS block device support, Paolo Bonzini, 2016/11/23