[Top][All Lists]

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 1/2] block/vxhs.c: Add support for a new bloc

From: ashish mittal
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 1/2] block/vxhs.c: Add support for a new block device type called "vxhs"
Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2017 09:59:32 -0800

On Wed, Mar 8, 2017 at 5:04 AM, Ketan Nilangekar
<address@hidden> wrote:
>> On Mar 8, 2017, at 1:13 AM, Daniel P. Berrange <address@hidden> wrote:
>>> On Tue, Mar 07, 2017 at 05:27:55PM -0800, ashish mittal wrote:
>>> Thanks! There is one more input I need some help with!
>>> VxHS network library opens a fixed number of connection channels to a
>>> given host, and all the vdisks (that connect to the same host) share
>>> these connection channels.
>>> Therefore, we need to open secure channels to a specific target host
>>> only once for the first vdisk that connects to that host. All the
>>> other vdisks that connect to the same target host will share the same
>>> set of secure communication channels.
>>> I hope the above scheme is acceptable?
>> I don't think I'm in favour of such an approach, as it forces a single
>> QEMU process to use the same privileges for all disks it uses.
>> Consider an example where a QEMU process has two disks, one shared
>> readonly disk and one exclusive writable disk, both on the same host.
> This is not a use case for VxHS as a solution. We do not support sharing of 
> vdisks across QEMU instances.
> Vxhs library was thus not designed to open different connections for 
> individual vdisks within a QEMU instance.
> Implementing this will involve rewrite of significant parts of libvxhs client 
> and server. Is this a new requirement for acceptance into QEMU?
>> It is reasonable as an administrator to want to use different credentials
>> for each of these. ie, they might have a set of well known credentials to
>> authenticate to get access to the read-only disk, but have a different set
>> of strictly limited access credentials to get access to the writable disk
>> Trying to re-use the same connection for multiple cause prevents QEMU from
>> authenticating with different credentials per disk, so I don't think that
>> is a good approach - each disk should have totally independant state.

libvxhs does not make any claim to fit all the general purpose
use-cases. It was purpose-built to be the communication channel for
our block device service. As such, we do not need/support all the
general use-cases. For the same reason we changed the name of the
library from linqnio to libvxhs (v8 changelog, #2).

Having dedicated communication channels for each device, or sharing
the channels between multiple devices, should both be acceptable
choices. The latter, IO multiplexing, is also a widely adopted IO
model. It just happens to fit our use-cases better.

Binding access control to a communication channel would prevent
anybody from using the latter approach. Having a separate way to allow
access-control would permit the use of latter also.

>>> If yes, then we have a couple of options to implement this:
>>> (1) Accept the TLS credentials per vdisk using the previously
>>> discussed --object tls-creds-x509 mechanism. In this case, if more
>>> than one vdisk have the same host info, then we will use only the
>>> first one's creds to set up the secure connection, and ignore the
>>> others. vdisks that connect to different target hosts will use their
>>> individual tls-creds-x509 to set up the secure channels. This is, of
>>> course, not relevant for qemu-img/qemu-io as they can open only one
>>> vdisk at a time.
>>> (2) Instead of having a per-vdisk --object tls-creds-x509, have a
>>> single such argument on the command line for vxhs block device code to
>>> consume - if that is possible! One way to achieve this could be the
>>> user/password authentication we discussed earlier, which we could use
>>> to pass the directory where cert/keys are kept.
>>> (3) Use the instance UUID, when available, to lookup the cert files
>>> per instance (i.e. for qemu-kvm), and use the --object tls-creds-x509
>>> mechanism, when instance UUID is NULL (i.e. qemu-io, qemu-img etc).
>>> The cert/key files are anyway protected by file permissions in either
>>> case, so I guess there is no additional security provided by either
>>> method.
>> Regards,
>> Daniel
>> --
>> |: http://berrange.com      -o-    http://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange/ :|
>> |: http://libvirt.org              -o-             http://virt-manager.org :|
>> |: http://entangle-photo.org       -o-    http://search.cpan.org/~danberr/ :|

reply via email to

[Prev in Thread] Current Thread [Next in Thread]