Re: [PATCH V4] target/i386/kvm: Add Hyper-V direct tlb flush support

[Vitaly Kuznetsov]

Roman Kagan <address@hidden> writes:

> On Tue, Nov 12, 2019 at 11:34:27AM +0800, address@hidden wrote:
>> From: Tianyu Lan <address@hidden>
>> 
>> Hyper-V direct tlb flush targets KVM on Hyper-V guest.
>> Enable direct TLB flush for its guests meaning that TLB
>> flush hypercalls are handled by Level 0 hypervisor (Hyper-V)
>> bypassing KVM in Level 1. Due to the different ABI for hypercall
>> parameters between Hyper-V and KVM, KVM capabilities should be
>> hidden when enable Hyper-V direct tlb flush otherwise KVM
>> hypercalls may be intercepted by Hyper-V. Add new parameter
>> "hv-direct-tlbflush". Check expose_kvm and Hyper-V tlb flush
>> capability status before enabling the feature.
>> 
>> Signed-off-by: Tianyu Lan <address@hidden>
>> ---
>> Change since v3:
>>        - Fix logic of Hyper-V passthrough mode with direct
>>        tlb flush.
>> 
>> Change sicne v2:
>>        - Update new feature description and name.
>>        - Change failure print log.
>> 
>> Change since v1:
>>        - Add direct tlb flush's Hyper-V property and use
>>        hv_cpuid_check_and_set() to check the dependency of tlbflush
>>        feature.
>>        - Make new feature work with Hyper-V passthrough mode.
>> ---
>>  docs/hyperv.txt   | 10 ++++++++++
>>  target/i386/cpu.c |  2 ++
>>  target/i386/cpu.h |  1 +
>>  target/i386/kvm.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>  4 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
>> 
>> diff --git a/docs/hyperv.txt b/docs/hyperv.txt
>> index 8fdf25c829..140a5c7e44 100644
>> --- a/docs/hyperv.txt
>> +++ b/docs/hyperv.txt
>> @@ -184,6 +184,16 @@ enabled.
>>  
>>  Requires: hv-vpindex, hv-synic, hv-time, hv-stimer
>>  
>> +3.18. hv-direct-tlbflush
>> +=======================
>> +Enable direct TLB flush for KVM when it is running as a nested
>> +hypervisor on top Hyper-V. When enabled, TLB flush hypercalls from L2
>> +guests are being passed through to L0 (Hyper-V) for handling. Due to ABI
>> +differences between Hyper-V and KVM hypercalls, L2 guests will not be
>> +able to issue KVM hypercalls (as those could be mishanled by L0
>> +Hyper-V), this requires KVM hypervisor signature to be hidden.
>
> On a second thought, I wonder if this is the only conflict we have.
>
> In KVM, kvm_emulate_hypercall, when sees Hyper-V hypercalls enabled,
> just calls kvm_hv_hypercall and returns.  I.e. once the userspace
> enables Hyper-V hypercalls (which QEMU does when any of hv_* flags is
> given), KVM treats *all* hypercalls as Hyper-V ones and handles *no* KVM
> hypercalls.

Yes, but only after guest enables Hyper-V hypercalls by writing to
HV_X64_MSR_HYPERCALL. E.g. if you run a Linux guest and add a couple
hv_* flags on the QEMU command line the guest will still be able to use
KVM hypercalls normally becase Linux won't enable Hyper-V hypercall
page.

>
> So, if hiding the KVM hypervisor signature is the only way to prevent the
> guest from issuing KVM hypercalls (need to double-check), then, I'm
> afraid, we just need to require it as soon as any Hyper-V feature is
> enabled.
>

If we do that we're going to break a lot of setups in the wild which run
Linux guests with hv_* flags (e.g. just to keep configuration the same
for Windows/Linux or by mistake/misunderstanding).

When Hyper-V enlightenments are enabled, KVM signature moves to
0x40000100 so if a guest is still able to find it -- then it knows
what's going on. I'd suggest we maintain the status quo.

-- 
Vitaly