Re: [PATCH v3 0/9] Generalize memory encryption models

[David Gibson]

On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 03:47:23PM +1000, David Gibson wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 24, 2020 at 09:06:48AM +0200, Cornelia Huck wrote:
> > On Mon, 22 Jun 2020 16:27:28 +0200
> > Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> wrote:
> > 
> > > On 19.06.20 04:05, David Gibson wrote:
> > > > A number of hardware platforms are implementing mechanisms whereby the
> > > > hypervisor does not have unfettered access to guest memory, in order
> > > > to mitigate the security impact of a compromised hypervisor.
> > > > 
> > > > AMD's SEV implements this with in-cpu memory encryption, and Intel has
> > > > its own memory encryption mechanism.  POWER has an upcoming mechanism
> > > > to accomplish this in a different way, using a new memory protection
> > > > level plus a small trusted ultravisor.  s390 also has a protected
> > > > execution environment.
> > > > 
> > > > The current code (committed or draft) for these features has each
> > > > platform's version configured entirely differently.  That doesn't seem
> > > > ideal for users, or particularly for management layers.
> > > > 
> > > > AMD SEV introduces a notionally generic machine option
> > > > "machine-encryption", but it doesn't actually cover any cases other
> > > > than SEV.
> > > > 
> > > > This series is a proposal to at least partially unify configuration
> > > > for these mechanisms, by renaming and generalizing AMD's
> > > > "memory-encryption" property.  It is replaced by a
> > > > "host-trust-limitation" property pointing to a platform specific
> > > > object which configures and manages the specific details.
> > > > 
> > > > For now this series covers just AMD SEV and POWER PEF.  I'm hoping it
> > > > can be extended to cover the Intel and s390 mechanisms as well,
> > > > though.  
> > > 
> > > Let me try to summarize what I understand what you try to achieve:
> > > one command line parameter for all platforms that 
> > > 
> > > common across all platforms:
> > > - disable KSM
> > > - by default enables iommu_platform
> > > 
> > > 
> > > per platform:
> > > - setup the necessary encryption scheme when appropriate
> > > - block migration
> > > -....
> > > 
> > > 
> > > The tricky part is certainly the per platform thing. For example on
> > > s390 we just have a cpumodel flag that provides interfaces to the guest
> > > to switch into protected mode via the ultravisor. This works perfectly
> > > fine with the host model, so no need to configure anything.  The platform
> > > code then disables KSM _on_switchover_ and not in general. Because the 
> > > guest CAN switch into protected, but it does not have to.
> > > 
> > > So this feels really hard to do right. Would a virtual BoF on KVM forum
> > > be too late? We had a BoF on protected guests last year and that was
> > > valuable.
> > 
> > Maybe we can do some kind of call to discuss this earlier? (Maybe in
> > the KVM call slot on Tuesdays?) I think it would be really helpful if
> > everybody would have at least a general understanding about how
> > encryption/protection works on the different architectures.
> 
> Yes, I think this would be a good idea.  KVM Forum is probably later
> than we want, plus since it is virtual, I probably won't be shifting
> into the right timezone to attend much of it.
> 
> I don't know when that Tuesday KVM call is.  Generally the best
> available time for Australia/Europe meetings this time of year is 9am
> CET / 5pm AEST.  As a once off I could go somewhat later into my
> evening, though.

Oh.. plus I'm on holiday next week and the one after (27 Jun - 12 Jul).

-- 
David Gibson                    | I'll have my music baroque, and my code
david AT gibson.dropbear.id.au  | minimalist, thank you.  NOT _the_ _other_
                                | _way_ _around_!
http://www.ozlabs.org/~dgibson

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