qemu-devel
[Top][All Lists]
Advanced

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [RFC PATCH 00/13] Add support for Mirror VM.


From: Steve Rutherford
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 00/13] Add support for Mirror VM.
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 2021 15:04:32 -0700

On Tue, Aug 17, 2021 at 1:50 PM Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum
<tobin@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
>
>
> On 8/17/21 12:32 PM, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> > There's three possibilities for this:
> >
> > 1) the easy one: the bottom 4G of guest memory are mapped in the
> > mirror VM 1:1.  The ram_addr_t-based addresses are shifted by either
> > 4G or a huge value such as 2^42 (MAXPHYADDR - physical address
> > reduction - 1). This even lets the migration helper reuse the OVMF
> > runtime services memory map (but be careful about thread safety...).
>
> This is essentially what we do in our prototype, although we have an
> even simpler approach. We have a 1:1 mapping that maps an address to
> itself with the cbit set. During Migration QEMU asks the migration
> handler to import/export encrypted pages and provides the GPA for said
> page. Since the migration handler only exports/imports encrypted pages,
> we can have the cbit set for every page in our mapping. We can still use
> OVMF functions with these mappings because they are on encrypted pages.
> The MH does need to use a few shared pages (to communicate with QEMU,
> for instance), so we have another mapping without the cbit that is at a
> large offset.
>
> I think this is basically equivalent to what you suggest. As you point
> out above, this approach does require that any page that will be
> exported/imported by the MH is mapped in the guest. Is this a bad
> assumption? The VMSA for SEV-ES is one example of a region that is
> encrypted but not mapped in the guest (the PSP handles it directly). We
> have been planning to map the VMSA into the guest to support migration
> with SEV-ES (along with other changes).

Ahh, It sounds like you are looking into sidestepping the existing
AMD-SP flows for migration. I assume the idea is to spin up a VM on
the target side, and have the two VMs attest to each other. How do the
two sides know if the other is legitimate? I take it that the source
is directing the LAUNCH flows?


--Steve



reply via email to

[Prev in Thread] Current Thread [Next in Thread]