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Re: [PATCH v5 7/9] virtiofsd: Create new file with fscreate set
From: |
Vivek Goyal |
Subject: |
Re: [PATCH v5 7/9] virtiofsd: Create new file with fscreate set |
Date: |
Mon, 7 Feb 2022 09:07:59 -0500 |
On Mon, Feb 07, 2022 at 11:38:12AM +0000, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> * Vivek Goyal (vgoyal@redhat.com) wrote:
> > This patch adds support to set /proc/thread-self/attr/fscreate before
> > file creation. It is set to a value as sent by client. This will allow
> > for atomic creation of security context on files w.r.t file creation.
> >
> > This is primarily useful when either there is no SELinux enabled on
> > host or host and guest policies are in sync and don't conflict.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
>
> Minor nit below, but I think this is right:
>
> Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
>
> I would however prefer if you could split this patch; it's a bit long to
> review.
Ok, I will look into splitting it.
>
>
> > ---
> > tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 317 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> > 1 file changed, 290 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
> > b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
> > index 82023bf3d4..acb99aa2fc 100644
> > --- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
> > +++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
> > @@ -173,10 +173,14 @@ struct lo_data {
> >
> > /* An O_PATH file descriptor to /proc/self/fd/ */
> > int proc_self_fd;
> > + /* An O_PATH file descriptor to /proc/self/task/ */
> > + int proc_self_task;
> > int user_killpriv_v2, killpriv_v2;
> > /* If set, virtiofsd is responsible for setting umask during creation
> > */
> > bool change_umask;
> > int user_posix_acl, posix_acl;
> > + /* Keeps track if /proc/<pid>/attr/fscreate should be used or not */
> > + bool use_fscreate;
> > };
> >
> > static const struct fuse_opt lo_opts[] = {
> > @@ -230,6 +234,11 @@ static struct lo_inode *lo_find(struct lo_data *lo,
> > struct stat *st,
> > static int xattr_map_client(const struct lo_data *lo, const char
> > *client_name,
> > char **out_name);
> >
> > +#define FCHDIR_NOFAIL(fd) do { \
> > + int fchdir_res = fchdir(fd); \
> > + assert(fchdir_res == 0); \
> > + } while (0)
> > +
> > static bool is_dot_or_dotdot(const char *name)
> > {
> > return name[0] == '.' &&
> > @@ -256,6 +265,33 @@ static struct lo_data *lo_data(fuse_req_t req)
> > return (struct lo_data *)fuse_req_userdata(req);
> > }
> >
> > +/*
> > + * Tries to figure out if /proc/<pid>/attr/fscrate is usable or not. With
> > + * selinux=0, read from fscreate returns -EINVAL.
> > + *
> > + * TODO: Link with libselinux and use is_selinux_enabled() instead down
> > + * the line. It probably will be more reliable indicator.
> > + */
> > +static bool is_fscreate_usable(struct lo_data *lo)
> > +{
> > + char procname[64];
> > + int fscreate_fd;
> > + size_t bytes_read;
> > +
> > + sprintf(procname, "%d/attr/fscreate", gettid());
> > + fscreate_fd = openat(lo->proc_self_task, procname, O_RDWR);
> > + if (fscreate_fd == -1) {
> > + return false;
> > + }
> > +
> > + bytes_read = read(fscreate_fd, procname, 64);
> > + close(fscreate_fd);
> > + if (bytes_read == -1) {
> > + return false;
> > + }
> > + return true;
> > +}
> > +
> > /*
> > * Load capng's state from our saved state if the current thread
> > * hadn't previously been loaded.
> > @@ -1284,16 +1320,140 @@ static void lo_restore_cred_gain_cap(struct
> > lo_cred *old, bool restore_umask,
> > }
> > }
> >
> > +/* Helpers to set/reset fscreate */
> > +static int open_set_proc_fscreate(struct lo_data *lo, const void *ctx,
> > + size_t ctxlen, int *fd)
> > +{
> > + char procname[64];
> > + int fscreate_fd, err = 0;
> > + size_t written;
> > +
> > + sprintf(procname, "%d/attr/fscreate", gettid());
> > + fscreate_fd = openat(lo->proc_self_task, procname, O_WRONLY);
> > + err = fscreate_fd == -1 ? errno : 0;
> > + if (err) {
> > + return err;
> > + }
> > +
> > + written = write(fscreate_fd, ctx, ctxlen);
> > + err = written == -1 ? errno : 0;
> > + if (err) {
> > + goto out;
> > + }
> > +
> > + *fd = fscreate_fd;
> > + return 0;
> > +out:
> > + close(fscreate_fd);
> > + return err;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void close_reset_proc_fscreate(int fd)
> > +{
> > + if ((write(fd, NULL, 0)) == -1) {
> > + fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_WARNING, "Failed to reset fscreate. err=%d\n",
> > errno);
> > + }
> > + close(fd);
> > + return;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int do_mknod_symlink_secctx(fuse_req_t req, struct lo_inode *dir,
> > + const char *name, const char
> > *secctx_name)
> > +{
> > + int path_fd, err;
> > + char procname[64];
> > + struct lo_data *lo = lo_data(req);
> > +
> > + if (!req->secctx.ctxlen) {
> > + return 0;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* Open newly created element with O_PATH */
> > + path_fd = openat(dir->fd, name, O_PATH | O_NOFOLLOW);
> > + err = path_fd == -1 ? errno : 0;
> > + if (err) {
> > + return err;
> > + }
> > + sprintf(procname, "%i", path_fd);
> > + FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->proc_self_fd);
> > + /* Set security context. This is not atomic w.r.t file creation */
> > + err = setxattr(procname, secctx_name, req->secctx.ctx,
> > req->secctx.ctxlen,
> > + 0);
> > + if (err) {
> > + err = errno;
> > + }
> > + FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->root.fd);
> > + close(path_fd);
> > + return err;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int do_mknod_symlink(fuse_req_t req, struct lo_inode *dir,
> > + const char *name, mode_t mode, dev_t rdev,
> > + const char *link)
> > +{
> > + int err, fscreate_fd = -1;
> > + const char *secctx_name = req->secctx.name;
> > + struct lo_cred old = {};
> > + struct lo_data *lo = lo_data(req);
> > + char *mapped_name = NULL;
> > + bool secctx_enabled = req->secctx.ctxlen;
> > + bool do_fscreate = false;
> > +
> > + if (secctx_enabled && lo->xattrmap) {
> > + err = xattr_map_client(lo, req->secctx.name, &mapped_name);
> > + if (err < 0) {
> > + return -err;
> > + }
> > + secctx_name = mapped_name;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * If security xattr has not been remapped and selinux is enabled on
> > + * host, set fscreate and no need to do a setxattr() after file
> > creation
> > + */
> > + if (secctx_enabled && !mapped_name && lo->use_fscreate) {
> > + do_fscreate = true;
> > + err = open_set_proc_fscreate(lo, req->secctx.ctx,
> > req->secctx.ctxlen,
> > + &fscreate_fd);
> > + if (err) {
> > + goto out;
> > + }
> > + }
> > +
> > + err = lo_change_cred(req, &old, lo->change_umask && !S_ISLNK(mode));
> > + if (err) {
> > + goto out;
> > + }
> > +
> > + err = mknod_wrapper(dir->fd, name, link, mode, rdev);
> > + err = err == -1 ? errno : 0;
> > + lo_restore_cred(&old, lo->change_umask && !S_ISLNK(mode));
> > + if (err) {
> > + goto out;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (!do_fscreate) {
> > + err = do_mknod_symlink_secctx(req, dir, name, secctx_name);
> > + if (err) {
> > + unlinkat(dir->fd, name, S_ISDIR(mode) ? AT_REMOVEDIR : 0);
> > + }
> > + }
> > +out:
> > + if (fscreate_fd != -1) {
> > + close_reset_proc_fscreate(fscreate_fd);
> > + }
> > + g_free(mapped_name);
> > + return err;
> > +}
> > +
> > static void lo_mknod_symlink(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t parent,
> > const char *name, mode_t mode, dev_t rdev,
> > const char *link)
> > {
> > - int res;
> > int saverr;
> > struct lo_data *lo = lo_data(req);
> > struct lo_inode *dir;
> > struct fuse_entry_param e;
> > - struct lo_cred old = {};
> >
> > if (is_empty(name)) {
> > fuse_reply_err(req, ENOENT);
> > @@ -1311,21 +1471,11 @@ static void lo_mknod_symlink(fuse_req_t req,
> > fuse_ino_t parent,
> > return;
> > }
> >
> > - saverr = lo_change_cred(req, &old, lo->change_umask && !S_ISLNK(mode));
> > + saverr = do_mknod_symlink(req, dir, name, mode, rdev, link);
> > if (saverr) {
> > goto out;
> > }
> >
> > - res = mknod_wrapper(dir->fd, name, link, mode, rdev);
> > -
> > - saverr = errno;
> > -
> > - lo_restore_cred(&old, lo->change_umask && !S_ISLNK(mode));
> > -
> > - if (res == -1) {
> > - goto out;
> > - }
> > -
> > saverr = lo_do_lookup(req, parent, name, &e, NULL);
> > if (saverr) {
> > goto out;
> > @@ -2001,13 +2151,16 @@ static int lo_do_open(struct lo_data *lo, struct
> > lo_inode *inode,
> > return 0;
> > }
> >
> > -static int do_lo_create(fuse_req_t req, struct lo_inode *parent_inode,
> > - const char *name, mode_t mode,
> > - struct fuse_file_info *fi, int* open_fd)
> > +static int do_create_nosecctx(fuse_req_t req, struct lo_inode
> > *parent_inode,
> > + const char *name, mode_t mode,
> > + struct fuse_file_info *fi, int *open_fd)
> > {
> > - int err = 0, fd;
> > + int err, fd;
> > struct lo_cred old = {};
> > struct lo_data *lo = lo_data(req);
> > + int flags;
> > +
> > + flags = fi->flags | O_CREAT | O_EXCL;
> >
> > err = lo_change_cred(req, &old, lo->change_umask);
> > if (err) {
> > @@ -2015,13 +2168,106 @@ static int do_lo_create(fuse_req_t req, struct
> > lo_inode *parent_inode,
> > }
> >
> > /* Try to create a new file but don't open existing files */
> > - fd = openat(parent_inode->fd, name, fi->flags | O_CREAT | O_EXCL,
> > mode);
> > - if (fd == -1) {
> > - err = errno;
> > - } else {
> > + fd = openat(parent_inode->fd, name, flags, mode);
> > + err = fd == -1 ? errno : 0;
> > + lo_restore_cred(&old, lo->change_umask);
> > + if (!err) {
> > *open_fd = fd;
> > }
> > - lo_restore_cred(&old, lo->change_umask);
> > + return err;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int do_create_secctx_fscreate(fuse_req_t req,
> > + struct lo_inode *parent_inode,
> > + const char *name, mode_t mode,
> > + struct fuse_file_info *fi, int
> > *open_fd)
> > +{
> > + int err = 0, fd = -1, fscreate_fd = -1;
> > + struct lo_data *lo = lo_data(req);
> > +
> > + err = open_set_proc_fscreate(lo, req->secctx.ctx, req->secctx.ctxlen,
> > + &fscreate_fd);
> > + if (err) {
> > + return err;
> > + }
> > +
> > + err = do_create_nosecctx(req, parent_inode, name, mode, fi, &fd);
> > +
> > + close_reset_proc_fscreate(fscreate_fd);
> > + if (!err) {
> > + *open_fd = fd;
> > + }
> > + return err;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int do_create_secctx_noatomic(fuse_req_t req,
> > + struct lo_inode *parent_inode,
> > + const char *name, mode_t mode,
> > + struct fuse_file_info *fi,
> > + const char *secctx_name, int *open_fd)
> > +{
> > + int err = 0, fd = -1;
> > +
> > + err = do_create_nosecctx(req, parent_inode, name, mode, fi, &fd);
> > + if (err) {
> > + goto out;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* Set security context. This is not atomic w.r.t file creation */
> > + err = fsetxattr(fd, secctx_name, req->secctx.ctx, req->secctx.ctxlen,
> > 0);
> > + err = err == -1 ? errno : 0;
> > +out:
> > + if (!err) {
> > + *open_fd = fd;
> > + } else {
> > + if (fd != -1) {
> > + close(fd);
> > + unlinkat(parent_inode->fd, name, 0);
> > + }
> > + }
> > + return err;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int do_lo_create(fuse_req_t req, struct lo_inode *parent_inode,
> > + const char *name, mode_t mode,
> > + struct fuse_file_info *fi, int *open_fd)
> > +{
> > + struct lo_data *lo = lo_data(req);
> > + char *mapped_name = NULL;
> > + int err;
> > + const char *ctxname = req->secctx.name;
> > + bool secctx_enabled = req->secctx.ctxlen;
> > +
> > + if (secctx_enabled && lo->xattrmap) {
> > + err = xattr_map_client(lo, req->secctx.name, &mapped_name);
> > + if (err < 0) {
> > + return -err;
> > + }
> > +
> > + ctxname = mapped_name;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (secctx_enabled) {
> > + /*
> > + * If security.selinux has not been remapped and selinux is
> > enabled,
> > + * use fscreate to set context before file creation.
> > + * Otherwise fallback to non-atomic method of file creation
> > + * and xattr settting.
> > + */
> > + if (!mapped_name && lo->use_fscreate) {
> > + err = do_create_secctx_fscreate(req, parent_inode, name, mode,
> > fi,
> > + open_fd);
> > + goto out;
>
> This can turn into another nested } else { and you don't need the out:
>
I guess I will have to put do_create_secctx_noatomic() into an else{} to
get rid of "goto out". The downside is that in second else loop, I
need to fallback non-atomic secctx creation. That means I will have
to call do_create_secctx_noatomic() one more time inside second else
block to fallback.
I feel I like current structure better until and unless you strongly
feel about it.
Thanks
Vivek
> Dave
> > + }
> > +
> > + err = do_create_secctx_noatomic(req, parent_inode, name, mode, fi,
> > + ctxname, open_fd);
> > + } else {
> > + err = do_create_nosecctx(req, parent_inode, name, mode, fi,
> > open_fd);
> > + }
> > +
> > +out:
> > + g_free(mapped_name);
> > return err;
> > }
> >
> > @@ -2856,11 +3102,6 @@ static int xattr_map_server(const struct lo_data
> > *lo, const char *server_name,
> > return -ENODATA;
> > }
> >
> > -#define FCHDIR_NOFAIL(fd) do { \
> > - int fchdir_res = fchdir(fd); \
> > - assert(fchdir_res == 0); \
> > - } while (0)
> > -
> > static bool block_xattr(struct lo_data *lo, const char *name)
> > {
> > /*
> > @@ -3522,6 +3763,15 @@ static void setup_namespaces(struct lo_data *lo,
> > struct fuse_session *se)
> > exit(1);
> > }
> >
> > + /* Get the /proc/self/task descriptor */
> > + lo->proc_self_task = open("/proc/self/task/", O_PATH);
> > + if (lo->proc_self_task == -1) {
> > + fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "open(/proc/self/task, O_PATH): %m\n");
> > + exit(1);
> > + }
> > +
> > + lo->use_fscreate = is_fscreate_usable(lo);
> > +
> > /*
> > * We only need /proc/self/fd. Prevent ".." from accessing parent
> > * directories of /proc/self/fd by bind-mounting it over /proc. Since
> > / was
> > @@ -3738,6 +3988,14 @@ static void setup_chroot(struct lo_data *lo)
> > exit(1);
> > }
> >
> > + lo->proc_self_task = open("/proc/self/task", O_PATH);
> > + if (lo->proc_self_fd == -1) {
> > + fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "open(\"/proc/self/task\", O_PATH): %m\n");
> > + exit(1);
> > + }
> > +
> > + lo->use_fscreate = is_fscreate_usable(lo);
> > +
> > /*
> > * Make the shared directory the file system root so that FUSE_OPEN
> > * (lo_open()) cannot escape the shared directory by opening a symlink.
> > @@ -3923,6 +4181,10 @@ static void fuse_lo_data_cleanup(struct lo_data *lo)
> > close(lo->proc_self_fd);
> > }
> >
> > + if (lo->proc_self_task >= 0) {
> > + close(lo->proc_self_task);
> > + }
> > +
> > if (lo->root.fd >= 0) {
> > close(lo->root.fd);
> > }
> > @@ -3950,6 +4212,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
> > .posix_lock = 0,
> > .allow_direct_io = 0,
> > .proc_self_fd = -1,
> > + .proc_self_task = -1,
> > .user_killpriv_v2 = -1,
> > .user_posix_acl = -1,
> > };
> > --
> > 2.34.1
> >
> --
> Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK
>
- Re: [PATCH v5 5/9] virtiofsd, fuse_lowlevel.c: Add capability to parse security context, (continued)
- [PATCH v5 8/9] virtiofsd: Create new file using O_TMPFILE and set security context, Vivek Goyal, 2022/02/02
- [PATCH v5 6/9] virtiofsd: Move core file creation code in separate function, Vivek Goyal, 2022/02/02
- [PATCH v5 3/9] virtiofsd: Parse extended "struct fuse_init_in", Vivek Goyal, 2022/02/02
- [PATCH v5 2/9] linux-headers: Update headers to v5.17-rc1, Vivek Goyal, 2022/02/02
- [PATCH v5 7/9] virtiofsd: Create new file with fscreate set, Vivek Goyal, 2022/02/02
- Re: [PATCH v5 0/9] virtiofsd: Add support for file security context at file creation, Dr. David Alan Gilbert, 2022/02/07
- Re: [PATCH v5 0/9] virtiofsd: Add support for file security context at file creation, Daniel P . Berrangé, 2022/02/07
- Re: [PATCH v5 0/9] virtiofsd: Add support for file security context at file creation, Vivek Goyal, 2022/02/07