Re: secure boot & direct kernel load (was: Re: [PATCH] x86/loader: only patch linux kernels)

[Michael S. Tsirkin]

On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 12:35:13PM +0200, Gerd Hoffmann wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 03:26:29AM -0400, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 09:21:26AM +0200, Gerd Hoffmann wrote:
> > > If the binary loaded via -kernel is *not* a linux kernel (in which
> > > case protocol == 0), do not patch the linux kernel header fields.
> > > 
> > > It's (a) pointless and (b) might break binaries by random patching
> > > and (c) changes the binary hash which in turn breaks secure boot
> > > verification.
> > > 
> > > Background: OVMF happily loads and runs not only linux kernels but
> > > any efi binary via direct kernel boot.
> > > 
> > > Note: Breaking the secure boot verification is a problem for linux
> > > kernels too, but fixed that is left for another day ...
> > 
> > Um we kind of care about Linux ;)
> > 
> > What's the plan?  I suspect we should just add a command line flag
> > to skip patching? And once we do that, it seems safer to just
> > always rely on the flag?
> 
> Well, there are more problems to solve here than just the patching.  So
> lets have a look at the bigger picture before discussion the details ...
> 
> [ Cc'ing Daniel + Cole ]
> 
> Current state of affairs is that OVMF supports two ways to boot a linux
> kernel:
> 
>  (1) Just load it as EFI binary and boot via linux kernel EFI stub,
>      which is the modern way to load a linux kernel (which is why you
>      can boot not only linux kernels but any efi binary).
> 
>  (2) Use the old EFI handover protocol.  Which is the RHEL-6 era way to
>      boot a linux kernel on EFI.
> 
> For method (1) secure boot verification must pass.  For (2) not.  So if
> you try to use direct kernel boot with secure boot enabled OVMF will
> first try (1), which will fail, then go fallback to (2).
> 
> The reason for the failure is not only the patching, but also the fact
> that the linux kernel is typically verified by shim.efi (and the distro
> keys compiled into the binary) instead of the firmware.
> 
> Going though (2) is not ideal for multiple reasons, so we need some
> strategy how we'll go handle direct kernel load with uefi and secure
> boot in a way that (1) works.
> 
> Options I see:
> 
>   (a) Stop using direct kernel boot, let virt-install & other tools
>       create vfat boot media with shim+kernel+initrd instead.
> 
>   (b) Enroll the distro signing keys in the efi variable store, so
>       booting the kernel without shim.efi works.
> 
>   (c) Add support for loading shim to qemu (and ovmf), for example
>       with a new '-shim' command line option which stores shim.efi
>       in some new fw_cfg file.
> 
> (b) + (c) both require a fix for the patching issue.  The options
> I see here are:
> 
>   (A) Move the patching from qemu to the linuxboot option rom.
>       Strictly speaking it belongs there anyway.  It doesn't look
>       that easy though, for qemu it is easier to gather all
>       information needed ...
> 
>   (B) Provide both patched and unpatched setup header, so the
>       guest can choose what it needs.
> 
>   (C) When implementing (c) above we can piggyback on the -shim
>       switch and skip patching in case it is present.
> 
>   (D) Add a flag to skip the patching.
> 
> Comments?  Other/better ideas?
> 
> take care,
>   Gerd

So if you didn't decide whether to do b or c then I guess D is
easiest and covers both cases?

-- 
MST