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Re: [PATCH 2/2] qemu-img: CVE-XXX Sanitize untrusted output from NBD ser


From: Richard W.M. Jones
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] qemu-img: CVE-XXX Sanitize untrusted output from NBD server
Date: Fri, 2 Aug 2024 22:03:05 +0100
User-agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15)

On Fri, Aug 02, 2024 at 02:26:06PM -0500, Eric Blake wrote:
> Error messages from an NBD server must be treated as untrusted; a
> malicious server can inject escape sequences to try and trigger RCE
> flaws via escape sequences to whatever terminal happens to be running
> qemu-img.  The easiest solution is to sanitize the output with the
> same code we use to produce sanitized (pseudo-)JSON over QMP.
> 
> Rich Jones originally pointed this flaw out at:
> https://lists.libguestfs.org/archives/list/guestfs@lists.libguestfs.org/thread/2NXA23G2V3HPWJYAO726PLNBEAAEUJAU/
> 
> With this patch, and a malicious server run with nbdkit 1.40 as:
> 
> $ nbdkit --log=null eval open=' printf \
>   "EPERM x\\r mess up the output \e[31mmess up the output\e[m mess up" >&2; \
>   exit 1 ' get_size=' echo 0 ' --run 'qemu-img info "$uri"'
> 
> we now get:
> 
> qemu-img: Could not open 'nbd://localhost': Requested export not available
> server reported: /tmp/nbdkitOZHOKB/open: x\r mess up the output 
> \u001B[31mmess up the output\u001B[m mess up
> 
> instead of an attempt to hide the name of the Unix socket and forcing
> the terminal to render part of the text red.
> 
> Note that I did _not_ sanitize the string being sent through
> trace-events in trace_nbd_server_error_msg; this is because I assume
> that our trace engines already treat all string strings as untrusted
> input and apply their own escaping as needed.
> 
> Reported-by: "Richard W.M. Jones" <rjones@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
> 
> ---
> 
> If my assumption about allowing raw escape bytes through to trace_
> calls is wrong (such as when tracing to stderr), let me know.  That's
> a much bigger audit to determine which trace points, if any, should
> sanitize data before tracing, and/or change the trace engines to
> sanitize all strings (with possible knock-on effects if trace output
> changes unexpectedly for a tool expecting something unsanitized).
> ---
>  nbd/client.c | 5 ++++-
>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/nbd/client.c b/nbd/client.c
> index c89c7504673..baa20d10d69 100644
> --- a/nbd/client.c
> +++ b/nbd/client.c
> @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
>  #include "trace.h"
>  #include "nbd-internal.h"
>  #include "qemu/cutils.h"
> +#include "qemu/unicode.h"
> 
>  /* Definitions for opaque data types */
> 
> @@ -230,7 +231,9 @@ static int nbd_handle_reply_err(QIOChannel *ioc, 
> NBDOptionReply *reply,
>      }
> 
>      if (msg) {
> -        error_append_hint(errp, "server reported: %s\n", msg);
> +        g_autoptr(GString) buf = g_string_sized_new(reply->length);
> +        mod_utf8_sanitize(buf, msg);
> +        error_append_hint(errp, "server reported: %s\n", buf->str);
>      }

Reviewed-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>

-- 
Richard Jones, Virtualization Group, Red Hat http://people.redhat.com/~rjones
Read my programming and virtualization blog: http://rwmj.wordpress.com
nbdkit - Flexible, fast NBD server with plugins
https://gitlab.com/nbdkit/nbdkit




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