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[PATCH v4 11/16] target/riscv: mmu changes for zicfiss shadow stack prot
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From: |
Deepak Gupta |
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Subject: |
[PATCH v4 11/16] target/riscv: mmu changes for zicfiss shadow stack protection |
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Date: |
Thu, 15 Aug 2024 18:07:05 -0700 |
zicfiss protects shadow stack using new page table encodings PTE.W=0,
PTE.R=0 and PTE.X=0. This encoding is reserved if zicfiss is not
implemented or if shadow stack are not enabled.
Loads on shadow stack memory are allowed while stores to shadow stack
memory leads to access faults. Shadow stack accesses to RO memory
leads to store page fault.
To implement special nature of shadow stack memory where only selected
stores (shadow stack stores from sspush) have to be allowed while rest
of regular stores disallowed, new MMU TLB index is created for shadow
stack.
Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
---
target/riscv/cpu_helper.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
target/riscv/internals.h | 3 +++
2 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/target/riscv/cpu_helper.c b/target/riscv/cpu_helper.c
index d3115da28d..4d282fd9ed 100644
--- a/target/riscv/cpu_helper.c
+++ b/target/riscv/cpu_helper.c
@@ -817,6 +817,18 @@ void riscv_cpu_set_mode(CPURISCVState *env, target_ulong
newpriv)
env->load_res = -1;
}
+static bool legal_sstack_access(int access_type, bool sstack_inst,
+ bool sstack_attribute)
+{
+ /*
+ * Read/write/execution permissions are checked as usual. Shadow
+ * stack enforcement is just that (1) instruction type must match
+ * the attribute unless (2) a non-SS load to an SS region.
+ */
+ return (sstack_inst == sstack_attribute) ||
+ ((access_type == MMU_DATA_LOAD) && sstack_attribute);
+}
+
/*
* get_physical_address_pmp - check PMP permission for this physical address
*
@@ -894,6 +906,8 @@ static int get_physical_address(CPURISCVState *env, hwaddr
*physical,
hwaddr ppn;
int napot_bits = 0;
target_ulong napot_mask;
+ bool is_sstack_insn = ((mmu_idx & MMU_IDX_SS_WRITE) == MMU_IDX_SS_WRITE);
+ bool sstack_page = false;
/*
* Check if we should use the background registers for the two
@@ -1104,13 +1118,34 @@ restart:
/* Check for reserved combinations of RWX flags. */
switch (pte & (PTE_R | PTE_W | PTE_X)) {
- case PTE_W:
case PTE_W | PTE_X:
return TRANSLATE_FAIL;
+ case PTE_W:
+ /* if bcfi enabled, PTE_W is not reserved and shadow stack page */
+ if (cpu_get_bcfien(env) && first_stage) {
+ sstack_page = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ return TRANSLATE_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ /* Illegal combo of instruction type and page attribute */
+ if (!legal_sstack_access(access_type, is_sstack_insn,
+ sstack_page)) {
+ /* shadow stack instruction and RO page then it's a page fault */
+ if (is_sstack_insn && ((pte & (PTE_R | PTE_W | PTE_X)) == PTE_R)) {
+ return TRANSLATE_FAIL;
+ }
+ /* In all other cases it's an access fault, so raise PMP_FAIL */
+ return TRANSLATE_PMP_FAIL;
}
int prot = 0;
- if (pte & PTE_R) {
+ /*
+ * If PTE has read bit in it or it's shadow stack page,
+ * then reads allowed
+ */
+ if ((pte & PTE_R) || sstack_page) {
prot |= PAGE_READ;
}
if (pte & PTE_W) {
@@ -1348,9 +1383,17 @@ void riscv_cpu_do_unaligned_access(CPUState *cs, vaddr
addr,
break;
case MMU_DATA_LOAD:
cs->exception_index = RISCV_EXCP_LOAD_ADDR_MIS;
+ /* shadow stack mis aligned accesses are access faults */
+ if (mmu_idx & MMU_IDX_SS_WRITE) {
+ cs->exception_index = RISCV_EXCP_LOAD_ACCESS_FAULT;
+ }
break;
case MMU_DATA_STORE:
cs->exception_index = RISCV_EXCP_STORE_AMO_ADDR_MIS;
+ /* shadow stack mis aligned accesses are access faults */
+ if (mmu_idx & MMU_IDX_SS_WRITE) {
+ cs->exception_index = RISCV_EXCP_STORE_AMO_ACCESS_FAULT;
+ }
break;
default:
g_assert_not_reached();
@@ -1406,6 +1449,11 @@ bool riscv_cpu_tlb_fill(CPUState *cs, vaddr address, int
size,
qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_MMU, "%s ad %" VADDR_PRIx " rw %d mmu_idx %d\n",
__func__, address, access_type, mmu_idx);
+ /* If shadow stack instruction initiated this access, treat it as store */
+ if (mmu_idx & MMU_IDX_SS_WRITE) {
+ access_type = MMU_DATA_STORE;
+ }
+
pmu_tlb_fill_incr_ctr(cpu, access_type);
if (two_stage_lookup) {
/* Two stage lookup */
diff --git a/target/riscv/internals.h b/target/riscv/internals.h
index 0ac17bc5ad..ddbdee885b 100644
--- a/target/riscv/internals.h
+++ b/target/riscv/internals.h
@@ -30,12 +30,15 @@
* - U+2STAGE 0b100
* - S+2STAGE 0b101
* - S+SUM+2STAGE 0b110
+ * - Shadow stack+U 0b1000
+ * - Shadow stack+S 0b1001
*/
#define MMUIdx_U 0
#define MMUIdx_S 1
#define MMUIdx_S_SUM 2
#define MMUIdx_M 3
#define MMU_2STAGE_BIT (1 << 2)
+#define MMU_IDX_SS_WRITE (1 << 3)
static inline int mmuidx_priv(int mmu_idx)
{
--
2.44.0
- Re: [PATCH v4 05/16] target/riscv: tracking indirect branches (fcfi) for zicfilp, (continued)
- [PATCH v4 10/16] target/riscv: tb flag for shadow stack instructions, Deepak Gupta, 2024/08/15
- [PATCH v4 12/16] target/riscv: implement zicfiss instructions, Deepak Gupta, 2024/08/15
- [PATCH v4 16/16] target/riscv: add trace-hooks for each case of sw-check exception, Deepak Gupta, 2024/08/15
- [PATCH v4 08/16] target/riscv: Add zicfiss extension, Deepak Gupta, 2024/08/15
- [PATCH v4 09/16] target/riscv: introduce ssp and enabling controls for zicfiss, Deepak Gupta, 2024/08/15
- [PATCH v4 11/16] target/riscv: mmu changes for zicfiss shadow stack protection,
Deepak Gupta <=
- [PATCH v4 13/16] target/riscv: compressed encodings for sspush and sspopchk, Deepak Gupta, 2024/08/15
- [PATCH v4 14/16] disas/riscv: enable disassembly for zicfiss instructions, Deepak Gupta, 2024/08/15
- [PATCH v4 15/16] disas/riscv: enable disassembly for compressed sspush/sspopchk, Deepak Gupta, 2024/08/15