Bellare and Rogaway suggested PSS over FDH because PSS provides a tighter security argument than FDH, due to the signer providing randomness, i.e. purely a provable security reason.
The proofs for RSA-FDH and RSA-PSS as normal signatures are from the one-wayness assumption on RSA. As you say, the reduction for RSA-PSS is tight, and that for RSA-FDH is not. The proof for Blind-RSA-FDH is from the One-More Discrete Log (OMDL) problem, and this would also be the case for Blind-RSA-PSS. I have not done the latter proof in detail, so this is just a guess, but I don't see a difference in tightness between the two. So from the point of view of tightness of security arguments, my guess is that Blind-RSA-FDH and Blind-RSA-PSS are about the same. I understand of course that there may be many other factors and reasons to prefer one over the other.
PSS, when used as a normal signature, can be de-randomized in the usual way of deriving the randomness by hashing the secret signing key and the message, but this does not seem to apply in the blind case.
Mihir